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Since Columbine, untold resources and planning efforts have been dedicated to 
active-shooter response by schools and public safety officials. Perhaps this is as it should 
be, but the almost exclusive focus on response has come at the expense of recovery. 
Active-shooter events were studied to identify and analyze gaps in recovery planning and 
operations. Research suggests that a comprehensive K-12 recovery plan with a phased 
approach would have enabled a faster and smoother recovery. There are no federal 
requirements for such a plan, and fewer than two-thirds of the states require a crisis plan 
for schools. The most important elements of active-shooter recovery for K-12 schools 
were determined: evacuation, relocation, and parent/student reunification; counseling and 
mental health therapy; funerals and memorials; post-incident staff reduction, suicide 
awareness, communication with non-English-speaking students and families, and 
donation management. Based on the lessons learned from six active-shooter incidents, 
steps are recommended for the successful, immediate, and national implementation of 
recovery planning for K-12 active-shooter events.  
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Since Columbine, many schools and public safety agencies have focused their 
attention on improving response protocols to active-shooter incidents.1 The attention applied 
to response, while appropriately applied, has come at the expense of a focus on recovery. In 
spite of the increasing trend of active-shooter incidents at K-12 schools, emergency planning 
has no national standards requiring a focus on the recovery phase. In some states, 
requirements for school emergency planning are limited to fire and lockdown drills. Without 
mandates for emergency planning, the depth and breadth of such plans varies. Barely half 
the states require a crisis plan for schools, and even fewer provide criteria needed to build a 
comprehensive plan that will meet all phases of the recovery process.2 In most K-12 active-
shooter incidents, the response is over in minutes, whereas the recovery for school staff and 
the victims’ families may take years. The planning efforts for disaster recovery in schools 
must become a priority focus for schools and school districts.  
Schools are continuing to operate with a false perception that they are prepared for a 
crisis such as an active-shooter type event. In reality, most crisis plans—if in place— 
identify lockdown procedures and a site selected to serve as a relocation facility if the need 
to evacuate students arises. While both actions are important, they are shortsighted as the 
means for readiness in the event of an active-shooter incident. This thesis explores the 
emergency recovery process in several K-12 active-shooter events. The purpose is to 
examine past events for best practices in recovery and to identify where gaps and challenges 
in the recovery process were the result of insufficient recovery planning. 
A. METHOD 
The research was driven by the questions, “What are the most important elements 
of active-shooter recovery for K-12 schools, and how can we learn from previous 
                                                 
1 E. Reed Smith and John B. Delaney, “A New Response,” Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 
(March 18, 2014), http://www.jems.com/ems-insider/articles/2014/02/a-new-response.html. 
2 Ashby, Cornelia, and William O. Jenkins Jr. Emergency Management: Most School Districts Have 
Developed Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional Federal Guidance. GAO-
07-609 (Washington DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007), 1. 
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incidents to inform measures of effectiveness in recovery?” Sample studies of past active-
shooter events at the K-12 schools Columbine High School, Sandy Hook Elementary 
School, Chardon High School, Rocori High School, Marysville-Pilchuck High School, 
and Santee High School were examined. The samples were selected intentionally to vary 
in details ranging from the size of the school district population to the number of fatalities 
by the assailants’ hand. Also considered was the location of the incidents in relationship 
to their region of the country. The geographic diversity was also intentional; its purpose 
was to demonstrate that the risk of an active-shooter incident is not determined by 
population, economics, or level of preparedness. Additionally, the incidents occur over a 
span of 17 years prior to the start of this research. The long span of time was also selected 
purposefully, to examine the impact made by events prior and whether or not those 
lessons learned had influence on schools’ planning efforts toward recovery.  
B. RESULTS 
The research was consistent in that no schools in the selected samples had a 
comprehensive recovery plan in place that identified all phases of recovery. Common 
elements of concern witnessed by the schools as they moved through the recovery 
process were relocation of students and subsequent reunification with parents, length of 
school closure and when to resume classes, and concern for the mental health of students 
and faculty coping with the aftershock of a violent incident. Research also revealed a gap 
between known best practices in emergency recovery planning and the implementation of 
comprehensive plans to build preparedness for active-shooter events. The research 
provided evidence that most schools nationwide have access to effective crisis planning 
tools and guidance supplied through various government agencies, but the practical 
implementation of said guidance is not being employed. Successful management of an 
active-shooter recovery is difficult to measure as each situation is unique and recovery 
time may take years. However, research indicates the transition from phase to phase in 
the recovery process is less turbulent when plans for the process are in place prior to the 
incident’s occurrence.  
 
xvii
C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A historical view of the timeline of K-12 active-shooter events in the last 50 years 
indicates a trend of violence against America’s children while they are attending school 
continues. Schools, of their own volition, are not accepting the responsibility to 
incorporate comprehensive recovery planning into their emergency crisis plans. An 
active-shooter incident can happen at any school in any city; steps must be taken to 
ensure compliance with recommendations provided by governments. Several 
recommendations are proposed through local, state, or national mandates to assure 
consistency. It is further recommended that states facilitate the mandates through state 
statutes, possibly by attaching them to state aid funding. 
 Schools must develop comprehensive crisis plans to include a recovery
annex.
 Schools must submit a progressive five-year plan for drills and exercises
that incorporate the plan doctrine.
 Districts must designate an emergency management coordinator with
emergency preparedness as the primary job function.
 All personnel employed by the district must be trained in the Incident
Command System to the level of ICS-100 and renew certifications every
three years.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The shooting at Columbine High School in April 1999 was the impetus for 
change in public safety’s approach to active-shooter events. The lessons learned that day 
fostered a change in response protocol by all public safety disciplines, especially to the 
early and rapid extraction of viable victims from hostile areas.1 The life safety benefit of 
this change in response protocol convinced many public safety leaders to design a 
curriculum to teach this new concept through trainings and full-scale exercises, gain buy-
in from organizational members, and establish the new response protocol as a standard 
procedure for active-shooter events. The new response concept has already been 
attributed to life-saving efforts for active-shooter victims, including those of the mass 
shooting event at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California.2  
For departments with limited time to dedicate to training, the extra attention to 
response, while essential, has arguably been paid at the expense of recovery. The 
recovery process that follows a disaster may continue for days or, in some cases, years 
and encompasses many actions that exceed the narrower scope of response, yet the trend 
in public safety is to spend considerably more time and resources preparing for response 
to active-shooter incidents as opposed to recovery. To support this point, the response to 
the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary was over in minutes; however, the recovery 
process to manage thousands of donations lasted nearly a year.3 The recovery for the 
community and families affected by the shooting at Columbine High School also took a 
significant amount of time. The families of victims pleaded to reconstruct the library, 
were so many had been slain. The process to garner the funding was itself a healing 
process, but again the recovery lasted months.4 The components to recovery such as 
                                                 
1 Rick Braziel et al., Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety 
Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center (Washington, 
DC: United States Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 2016), 67–69, 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/file/891996/download.  
2 Braziel et al., 74. 
3 Paul Kix, “65,000 Teddy Bears for Newtown, and One Man to Sort the World’s Grief,” Trace, 
December 13, 2015, https://www.thetrace.org/2015/12/sandy-hook-shooting-donations/. 
4 Kathleen Megan, “How Columbine Climbed Back,” Hartford Courant, December 22, 2012. 
 2
student evacuation/relocation to a neutral site, medication dispensing, feeding displaced 
students and faculty, student and parent/guardian custodial issues, public 
communications, resumption of classes, funerals and memorials, counseling, and long-
term relocation due to building remodeling or reconstruction all require planning 
attention from school officials.  
Recovery requires planning and training by both public safety and school 
personnel; the planning normally taking place under the aegis of an emergency operations 
plan (EOP). A standard practice for government emergency planning is the development 
of an EOP: it begins with the base plan that illustrates the plan owner’s responsibilities 
and defines tasks for each responsible party during an incident. For the purposes of this 
thesis, disaster plans and emergency plans are synonymous. Generally, the base plan is 
followed by task-specific annexes or addendums.5 A couple of examples include 
lockdown, evacuation, or recovery actions as well as many more. The plan may also 
contain Emergency Support Functions (ESF), a grouping of capabilities performed by 
disaster or emergency responders to provide services and resources to help bring an 
emergency event to its conclusion, thereby facilitating the affected community’s return to 
a normal state or condition. Each ESF describes which agencies are responsible and lists 
all supporting agencies.6  
Table 1 contains a list of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 
ESF categories. The bolded items are ESFs that may be put into action when an 
emergency operation center (EOC) stands up its operations in response to an active-
shooter event. Some jurisdictions may not have every ESF as a part of their emergency 
operations plans. 
 
                                                 
5 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency 
Operations Plans (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), 28–31, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33599.  
6 “Federal Emergency Management Agency Emergency Support Functions,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, September 13, 2016, https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/25512.  
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Table 1.   FEMA’s ESF Categories 
ESF 1—Transportation ESF 10—Hazardous Materials 
ESF 2—Communication ESF 11—Community Food & Water 
ESF 3—Public Works & Engineering ESF 12—Energy & Utilities 
ESF 4—Fire Fighting ESF 13—Public Safety & Security 
ESF 5—Emergency Management ESF 14—Long Term Recovery 
ESF 6—Mass Care & Sheltering ESF 15—Public Information 
ESF 7—Logistics Mgmt. and Resource 
Support 
ESF 16—Volunteers and Donations 
ESF 8—Medical Services ESF 17—Animal Care 
ESF 9—Search and Rescue ESF 18—Administration & Finance 
Bolded items are ESFs that may be put into action when an emergency operation center (EOC) 
stands up its operations in response to an active-shooter event. 
Emergency operations plans and ESFs are designed to assist emergency managers 
to coordinate a response, or courses of action, that lead to a successful conclusion of a 
disaster incident. A holistic approach to disaster planning also includes plans and 
processes, sometimes referred to as addendums or annexes, for accomplishing other 
objectives. For example, some plans may include annexes for debris management, 
damage assessments, recovery operations, or requirements for a family assistance center. 
In the case of a major disaster, a recovery plan is designed to help guide a jurisdiction 
through the recovery mission. Research reveals that the recovery mission requires the 
most time and resources of FEMA’s five missions: prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery.7 However, there are no federal requirements for K-12 schools to 
have emergency operations plans, there are only recommendations. Additionally, in 2007, 
only 32 states require emergency plans for schools; even then, they do not include 
specific criteria for plan development or content, including consideration for recovery 
operations.8  
                                                 
7 “National Preparedness Goal” Federal Emergency Management Agency, September 2015, 3, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/
National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf. 
8 Cornelia M. Ashby, Emergency Management: Status of School Districts’ Planning and 




Because the recovery process may continue for years, the consequences of not 
requiring a plan for such operations are potentially tragic. Even the most prepared 
professionals operate under a state of “organized chaos” when bringing a disaster to its 
earliest possible conclusion. Seasoned emergency responders understand this to be true 
because information and communication at the beginning of an event are usually limited, 
which causes confusion. As the response efforts progress, the chaos decreases because 
the organization of the response improves and more information is gleaned, which 
complements strategies and tactics. For school officials, experiencing a disaster is rare, 
which means they are unaccustomed to making decisions under heightened anxiety; 
proceeding without a plan or a road map may prove detrimental to a successful recovery. 
School districts operating without a plan are putting themselves at risk for a difficult and 
challenging recovery. 
Even in the absence of federal or state mandates to develop recovery plans, every 
K-12 school should have one. Experience has shown that people resist the idea of tragedy 
occurring at their front door. However, local public safety and emergency management 
practitioners need to understand and disseminate the lessons learned from previous 
school-related active-shooter events. If those events could be studied with an eye to the 
recovery phase, then standard requirements and elements for recovery planning, training, 
and execution of a recovery plan could be shared across the emergency management 
community, and, more importantly, with every K-12 school district in the United States. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the most important elements of active-shooter recovery plans for 
K-12 schools? 
2. What can we learn from previous K-12 active-shooter events to inform 
measures of effectiveness in recovery? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Following the events of 9/11, FEMA identified prevention, protection, response, 
and recovery as four key mission areas to improve our national preparedness.9 In the fall 
                                                 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Preparedness Goal,”1. 
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of 2011, mitigation was added as a fifth mission.10 The five missions collectively form an 
all-hazards approach to preparedness for disasters and emergencies. The following 
section presents literature on active-shooter events through a mission-specific lens.  
The term “active-shooter” is defined by the Department of Homeland Security as 
an “individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and 
populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms and there is no pattern or 
method to their selection of victims.”11 From 2000 to 2013, active-shooter incidents 
increased annually in the United States.12 A study conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Justice provides a comprehensive breakdown of 160 active-shooter events that occurred 
during that 13-year period.13 Although nearly half of the events occurred at businesses, 
educational institutions were the second-highest reported location for active-shooter 
incidents.14 The events that took place in April 1999 at Columbine High School arguably 
remain the watershed event in terms of raising the nation’s consciousness to the reality of 
school violence.15 Since that day in Colorado, school districts, public safety agencies, 
and governments have invested significant time and resources into active-shooter events.  
The ever-increasing number of active-shooter events has contributed to copious 
amounts of literature available in many forms. Although limited publicly, searches of 
most databases reveal reports generated by individuals or agencies from local, state, and 
federal jurisdictions. After action reports (AAR) are difficult to find in the public forum; 
research revealed if they were generated for review of a real event, they are generally 
                                                 
10 Jared T. Brown, Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: 
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R42073 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Report, 2011), 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42073.pdf. 
11 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter How to Respond” (Washington, 
DC: United States Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 2, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
active_shooter_booklet.pdf. 
12 Pete J. Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, “A Study of Active-Shooter Incidents in the United States 
Between 2000–2013,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 16, 2013, 8, https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/active shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf.  
13 Blair and Schweit, 8. 
14 Blair and Schweit, 13. 
15 James Alan Fox and Jenna Savage, “Mass Murder Goes to College: An Examination of Changes on 
College Campuses Following Virginia Tech,” Behavioral Scientist 52, no. 10 (2009): 1474. 
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only available internally to the event participants. Through email correspondence, Rocori 
Superintendent Scott Staska stated he believed most of the incident-related 
documentation relevant to their shooting incident was kept internally.16 Following the 
shooting at Marysville High School, a police commander stated that an internal 
discussion that took place will suffice and no AAR will be completed.17 Most of these 
types of reports provide valuable insight into the response, which may identify strengths 
and weaknesses recognized by the responders to the event. Finally, journals are available 
containing peer-reviewed articles regarding active-shooter response, preparedness, and 
mitigation. Theses and dissertations on the active-shooter topic are also excellent tertiary 
sources for consideration. 
1. Protection Mission 
Emergency planning for the educational system has existed for more than half a 
century. Fire drills became a staple in school’s emergency preparedness efforts following 
the tragic schoolhouse fire in Chicago at the Our Lady of the Angels School, where 92 
students and three teachers perished in December of 1958. Schools have used fire drills 
as a practice for emergency readiness in K-12 schools over much of that time. The 
existence of fire drills today is still relevant to school emergency planning, less so 
because of the threat of fire but more so for the organized evacuation of students.18 In 
more recent years, other threats have been added to school planning initiatives: severe 
weather, flu pandemics, and most recently, hostile action or active-shooter events.19 
Stone and Spencer advocate for more inclusion of school resource officers (SRO) into the 
preparedness planning for schools. SROs were first implemented in the 1950s; today this 
resource in schools is considered commonplace and is considered as one solution toward 
                                                 
16 Scott Staska, personal communication, July 17, 2017. 
17 Lewis Kamb, “No Police Reviews after 2 Deadly School Shootings,” Seattle Times, 25, 2015, 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/no-police-reviews-after-2-deadly-school-shootings/. 
18 Guy Bliesner and Mike Munger, “Fire Drills Are a Waste of Time,” Campus Safety Magazine, 
March 5, 2014, https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/safety/fire_drills_are_a_waste_of_time/. 
19 William E. Stone and David J. Spencer, “Enhancing an Active Shooter School Emergency Plan 
Using Ambient Materials and School Resource Officers,” Southwest Journal of Criminal Justice 7, no. 3 
(2010): 295–296. 
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hostile-action based preparedness.20 Stone and Spencer encourage schools to leverage the 
law enforcement knowledge and skill set of SROs by including them into their school’s 
emergency plan development and subsequent plan reviews. Both authors have extensive 
backgrounds in law enforcement and corrections; with their occupational biases in plain 
sight, their argument for more school security is sound, backed by sources, and addresses 
the need for more emergency-planning dialogue.21 
Locking down schools when a violent threat arrives has become a standard 
practice in some states.22 However, its practicality and effectiveness in every educational 
institution is debatable. A 2009 article by James Alan Fox and Jenna Savage in the 
American Behavioral Scientist details many differences between high schools and 
universities during active-shooter events.23 The planning characteristics for each are 
affected by their respective differences in functional use. One example provided is the 
adoption of lockdown procedures. Such procedures may be appropriate in K-12 schools; 
however, the actions are not practical in a sprawling college campus commonly open to 
the public and occupied by adults.24 The authors highlight seven recommendations for 
active-shooter planning and preparedness from a national study.25 According to Fox and 
Savage, the second most articulated practice is the adoption of a mass-notification 
system.26  
Unlike the Columbine era, the common practice of students and faculty carrying 
cellphones has changed the complexity of the protection mission. Reinforcing the 
importance of communications, authors Sattler, Katy, and Larpenteur conducted a study 
in 2011 measuring the effectiveness of texts and email for mass notifications when 
disasters strike. The results indicate emails and text messages have a 95 percent success 
                                                 
20 Stone and Spencer, 299. 
21 Stone and Spencer. 
22 Crisis Management Policy, Minnesota Statute 121A.035, accessed May 13, 2017, 
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/?id=121A.035. 
23 Fox and Savage, “Mass Murder Goes to College,”1466. 
24 Fox and Savage. 
25 Fox and Savage, 1469. 
26 Fox and Savage. 
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rate in conveying clear messages to the receiver. The authors identified challenges to 
notification systems, including Internet and cell phone signal disruptions, as well as 
character limitations for text messages.27  
2. Prevention Mission 
Following the Virginia Tech shooting in April 2007 in which 32 students and 
faculty were killed, many colleges and universities considered options to explore the 
prevention of such tragedies.28 Christopher Flynn and Dennis Heitzmann, two 
psychologists from Virginia Tech and Pennsylvania State University, respectively, 
address the psychological effects of an active-shooter event and how psychology may be 
applied to prevention. Flynn and Heitzmann address a handful of emergent issues that are 
psychology-related, but their suggestion to implement threat assessment teams delves 
into the heart of prevention.29 Their idea is that the team would include a psychologist 
who could provide psychological profiles of individuals, share mental health 
perspectives, and determine appropriate intervention for specific students.30  
Key to the potential success of threat assessment teams is early behavioral 
detection—determining a viable threat before a disaster occurs would save lives and 
emotional trauma. A 2010 collaborative report by the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. 
Department of Education, and the FBI compiled data from incidents of violence at 
institutions of higher learning from the past 100 years.31 Representatives from the three 
agencies used open-source data to assess methods of attack, the subject’s school 
                                                 
27 David Sattler N, Katy Larpenteur, and Gayle Shipley, “Active Shooter on Campus: Evaluating Text 
and Email Warning Message Effectiveness,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
8, no. 1 (2011): 1. 
28 Christopher Flynn and Dennis Heitzmann, “Tragedy at Virginia Tech: Trauma and Its Aftermath,” 
The Counseling Psychologist 36, no. 3 (2008): 479. 
29 Flynn and Heitzmann, 486. 
30 Flynn and Heitzmann, 486–487. 
31 Diana A. Drysdale, William Modzeleski, and Andre B. Simons, “Campus Attacks: Targeted 
Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education” (Washington, DC: United States Secret Service, 
United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, United States 
Department of Education, Federal bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 2010), iii. 
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affiliation, motivation for the attacks, and pre-incident behavior toward the targets.32 The 
report does not make claim that an effective threat assessment can be accomplished by 
virtue of identifying disruptive or abnormal behavior or by speculating about the intent of 
an individual. The report does state that every situation needs to be addressed on a case-
by-case basis, and that some college and university threat assessment teams use a three-
step process, which is described in the report, to evaluate a person’s violent risk 
potential.33  
The public debate over the prevention of active-shooter incidents is often 
polarized and contentious. Historically, the debate intensifies following a high-profile 
event such as Sandy Hook or Columbine. An active-shooter event is an intentional act 
and as such demands attention in the arena of the prevention mission. However, because 
the circumstances around school-related active-shooter incidents are extensive and the 
occurrences are not that frequent, developing prevention strategies is difficult. In a 2015 
issue of the British Journal of Criminology, Aaron Kupchik, John Brent, and Thomas 
Mowen make an argument for using psychology in the use of behavior-related prevention 
strategies for early active-shooter intervention.34 Following the track of public sentiment 
after the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Connecticut, the call for 
solutions to active-shooter violence were very similar to that following the events of 
Columbine High School in 1999.35 Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen contend that the outcry 
following the active-shooter events at Columbine and Sandy Hook puts too much 
emphasis on issues pertaining to gun control and increased school security; that ill-placed 
attention subsequently drowns out the call for an evidence-based response, which would 
include a psychological approach to violence prevention programs.36 As a sociology 
professor, Kupchik’s framework is biased toward social behavior analysis as a prevention 
                                                 
32 Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons, 11–21. 
33 Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons, 27. 
34 Aaron Kupchik, John J. Brent, and Thomas J. Mowen, “The Aftermath of Newtown: More of the 
Same,” British Journal of Criminology 55, no. 6 (November 2015): 1115–30, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/
azv049. British Journal of Criminology 55, no. 6 (2015): 1121. 
35 Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen, 1117. 
36 Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen, 1120. 
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method and against security and guns. He supports his argument by citing many sources 
substantiating the notion that behavioral red-flag moments preceded nearly every 
shooting.37 The position that behavioral analysis can contribute to the prevention of 
school-related active-shooter events is not supported by empirical evidence; however, it 
is at least a consideration for school planner’s’ overall strategy for active-shooter 
emergency planning.  
The most consistent argument in the literature for the prevention mission is to 
recognize a problem before it manifests into a tragedy, and Schuster’s 2010 article 
reinforces this assertion. She references a study by the U.S. Secret Service conducted in 
2002.38 The study’s findings fall directly in line with other research cited here, indicating 
that if threat assessment teams were allowed to evaluate suspicious or abnormal behavior 
and act on reports of significant behavioral changes, active-shooter events could be 
effectively reduced.39 The sources cited in the prevention section of this literature review 
show a consistent theme: behavioral analysis, when combined with threat assessments, 
may provide the early warning needed to stop active-shooter events. 
3. Recovery Mission 
From the moment an active-shooter threat is eliminated, the recovery mission 
begins. In a school setting, this process starts with the coordinated evacuation of students 
to another location followed by reunification with parents. Video evidence and witness 
accounts through the media show these events as chaotic, with the students and faculty 
experiencing high levels of anxiety. Academic research in this area has revealed an 
overriding theme: mental health considerations for students, faculty, and first responders 
deserve immediate consideration.  
A technique widely used in the public safety service to sustain positive mental 
health after a traumatic incident is the Critical Incident Stress Debriefing. The debriefing 
                                                 
37 Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen, 1115. 
38 Beth Schuster, “Preventing, Preparing for Critical Incidents in Schools,” National Institute of 
Justice, no. 262 (2010): 42. 
39 Schuster, 42–43. 
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is a formal intervention attended by all responders of an incident facilitated by trained 
mental health professionals.40 The International Journal of Emergency Mental Health 
article “Coping with Psychological Aftermath of School Violence” by Levenson, 
Memoli, and Flannery, states the importance of mental health and the need for immediate 
psychological attention to victims of violence.41 Although the article is nearly two 
decades old, it contains a considerable amount of cited data backed by empirical research. 
The article is written in support of a volunteer program—Assaulted Staff Action 
Program—benefiting victims and witnesses in the aftermath of a violent act through a 
type of group counseling.42 This type of peer-driven mental health intervention designed 
to help with the recovery process is becoming a standard practice in public safety, 
following violent or traumatic events.  
No matter the subject, real life experience is a valuable tool in preparing for the 
next happening. Capturing the circumstances of past events, real or exercises, is now a 
common practice in public safety; the information is collected and documented in a form 
called an after action report. William Steele’s 2015 book draws on lesson learned from 
traumatic experiences.43 His writings about tragic events such as 9/11, Chardon High 
School shooting, and the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, continue in the vein 
of drawing out from others the benefits of their crisis experiences. Steele’s 180-page 
account of multiple disasters provides insight from victims and responders valuable to the 
formation and implementation of a crisis recovery plan.  
Recovering from large-scale disasters is very often a long-term endeavor. One of 
the reasons for that is the emotional and psychological effect of traumatic experiences. In 
the case of terrorist-type events, the intent to inflict long-lasting psychological harm is the 
                                                 
40 Joseph A. Davis, “Critical Incident Stress Debriefing from a Traumatic Event,” Psychology Today, 
accessed October 31, 2017, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/crimes-and-misdemeanors/201302/
critical-incident-stress-debriefing-traumatic-event. 
41 Richard L. Levenson Jr., Michelle Memoli and Raymond B. Flannery Jr., “Coping with 
Psychological Aftermath of School Violence: The Teacher and the Assaulted Staff Action Program,” 
International Journal of Emergency Mental Health 2, no. 2 (2002): 107. 
42 Levenson, Memoli, and Flannery, 107. 
43 William Steele, Trauma in Schools and Communities: Recovery Lessons from Survivors and 
Responders (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
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purpose. This is an important connection for public safety to consider when developing 
plans for recovery. The RAND Corporation reproduced a book chapter by Tanielian and 
Stein as part of their reprint series.44 The chapter, titled “Understanding and Preparing 
for Psychological Consequences of Terrorism” gets to the core of why the recovery 
process to disaster has long-term influence on a school’s or a community’s mental health 
resilience. The article also highlights the importance of the relationship public health has 
in the recovery domain. This relationship is often left out of disaster-related planning, and 
as a result it is sometimes considered only as an afterthought.  
There are many phases to an active-shooter recovery process, each taking 
different forms and requiring a broad spectrum of resources. The mental health recovery 
process for individuals involved in an active-shooter event is personal and varies for each 
victim. Aaron Purcell’s 2007 article documents how a college university, as an 
institution, navigated the recovery process guided by the effort to find emotional healing 
for the entire community. In the days following the Virginia Tech shooting, the university 
received tens of thousands of condolence items.45 When confronted with the moral and 
ethical dilemma of how to respectfully cope with the overwhelming yet well-intended 
donations, the university realized they were confronted with two phases of the recovery 
process, donations management and mental health recovery. During the next six years, 
the university built an archival collection of the cards, letters, and banners; this collection 
reportedly provided closure for many of the victims and their families, and continues 
today as a reminder of the recovery process.46 Purcell’s article lends historical insight 
into the Virginia Tech tragedy, but more importantly to emergency managers, it 
illustrates the emotional healing phase necessitated by the extreme trauma generated by 
an active-shooter event.  
                                                 
44 Terri Tanielian and Bradley D. Stein, “Understanding and Preparing for the Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorism,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), product page, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
reprints/RP1217.html. 
45 Aaron D. Purcell, “More Than Flowers Left Behind: Building an Archival Collection and 
Remembering April 16, 2007 at Virginia Tech,” Journal of Archival Organization 10, no. 3–4 (2012): 
Abstract. 
46 Purcell, 241. 
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Health care facilities (HCF) are central to emergency operations planning. HCFs 
include hospitals, health clinics, hospices, and long-term care facilities. All HCFs are 
required to have an all-hazards approach to emergency and disaster planning, including 
active-shooter or terrorist incidents.47 A collaborative government prepared report by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services references lesson learned, trends in 
preparedness, and provides government recommendations for industry best practices in 
response and recovery.48 In addition, the report is the only one that identifies the need for 
a family assistance center to help families cope during the recovery phase.  
4. Conclusion 
The review of literature for this thesis did not reveal any sources that provided 
specific research dedicated to all aspects of the recovery mission for active-shooter 
events. Additional research is warranted in the form of reviewing after action reports 
from major events and studying high school and university emergency operations plans.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The area of study for this thesis is the recovery mission for K-12 schools with a 
focus on emergency or crisis planning for active-shooter events. The research focus is on 
the study of a process, a progression of events that must occur following every type of 
disaster event. The K-12 crisis preparedness culture is deficient in its approach to holistic 
emergency planning; it is lacking in oversight and direction.49 Gaps in minimum 
planning criteria could be addressed by many schools if government-supported guidance 
was implemented. This thesis examines the recovery process as experienced through 
previous school disasters, how that process aligned with the school’s perceived readiness 
                                                 
47 “Emergency-Prep-Rule,” Centers for Medicare, Medicaid, November 13, 2017, 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/SurveyCertEmergPrep/Emergency-
Prep-Rule.html. 
48 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Incorporating Active-shooter incident 
Planning into Health Care Facility Emergency Operations Plans (Washington, DC: United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2014), http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/documents/
active shooter-planning-eop2014.pdf. 
49 Cornelia Ashby and William O. Jenkins Jr. Emergency Management: Most School Districts Have 
Developed Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional Federal Guidance. GAO-
07-609. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007, 1. 
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for disaster, and its subsequent actions taken to perform recovery operations. Specific 
attention is applied to the phases of recovery planning where the most important elements 
of recovery are identified and how those elements are captured in policy 
recommendations to strengthen the resilience of K-12 emergency/crisis recovery 
planning.  
Research explored differences in K-12 school preparedness for recovery based on 
the availability of lessons learned from previous events. Events were selected from all 
regions of the country to explore the impact, if any, of differences in state regulatory 
mandates for emergency planning and the compliance thereof. Six schools were selected 
for analysis: Columbine High School, Chardon High School, Santee High School, 
Marysville-Pilchuck High School, Rocori High School, and Sandy Hook Elementary 
School. All of them suffered multiple casualties during active-shooter incidents, and 
fatalities ranged from two to 26, which provided a breadth of examination for recovery 
challenges. The year of occurrence was also an important factor; the events occurred 
between 1999 and 2014.  
The research and analysis for this thesis are limited to the mission of recovery. 
For this study, the recovery process begins when the life safety threat to civilians and 
emergency responders has ended. The duration of the recovery process is unique to the 
incident; for the purpose of this ’study’s recommendations and policy considerations, the 
recovery process does not extend past three years from the date of the incident.  
Because there is a profound difference in recovery planning between K-12 and 
post-secondary institutions, comparisons that include colleges and universities would not 
lend to standard recovery practices for K-12 schools. Parent custodial issues, legal adult 
status of college students, and the fact that most college campuses remain unlocked and 
open to the public are just a few of the reasons for removing colleges and universities 
from the sampling research.50  
                                                 
50 Fox and Savage, “Mass Murder Goes to College,”1465-1467 
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In states such as Minnesota, school statutes for fire drills and exit doors also 
encompass private schools; however, state statutes for crisis management policy do not.51 
As such, this research explores the potential for local, state, and national regulatory and 
statutory requirements for emergency planning; however, because of state statutory 
inconsistencies this paper does not consider private and parochial schools despite the 
assumption that the private system would not likely have any distinguishable differences 
in recovery planning practices.  
The data sources supporting the research for this thesis were accessed through 
open-source methods including incident-specific commission reports written in part or 
whole by governor-appointed committees, news and journal articles, government reports 
and state statutes, as well as direct email correspondence from school district personnel. 
Personal accounts from responders, victims, community residents, and witnesses 
describing details of their personal experiences in the recovery process were key elements 
to the research data.  
This thesis uses the sampling method of research, which according to William 
Tomchin is a “method conducted by choosing from a particular group or population of 
similitude.”52 Its purpose is to form generalizations about the group and, in the case of 
this research, to understand the current standards in emergency planning for active-
shooter events at K-12 schools. I examined a sample of actual active-shooter events at K-
12 schools and looked at several features regarding their recovery. My first aspect was to 
determine whether there was a recovery plan in place at the time of the incident. Second, 
I researched which obstacles were encountered and what effects they had on the school’s 
progression to recovery. And finally, I researched common elements between incidents 
where a comprehensive recovery plan including all phases of recovery would have made 
a noticeable difference.  
My assumption was that K-12 schools have been under-prepared for disaster. 
Personal experiences have informed my understanding that most schools have crisis plans 
                                                 
51 Crisis Management Policy. 
52 William M. K. Tomchim, “Sampling,” Research Methods Knowledge Base, accessed April 9, 2017, 
https://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/sampling.php. 
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in some form; however, many schools do not have plans specific to the recovery phase of 
disasters. In addition, few schools or their districts have considered all the phases of 
recovery they are likely to encounter following an active-shooter event. Federal support 
down to the district level only comes by way of recommendations and guidelines, 
research did not reveal any federal requirements for school district emergency 
planning.53 As of 2016, less than two-thirds of school districts reported requiring 
emergency operations plans; only a slight percentage more reported the same requirement 
of schools.54 These self-reported numbers from the schools expose a gap in school crisis 
preparedness. 
The outcome of this research has provided a benchmark model for what a phased 
approach to recovery should look like. School districts are able to use the model as a 
template for a recovery addendum to their emergency operations plans. This model 
provides a planning roadmap, beginning from the moment the lockdown order is 
removed and extending out years after the incident. With a comprehensive planning 
template in place, a compelling argument for a policy requiring a planned approach to 
active-shooter recovery can be easily illustrated. Such a requirement will provide the 
students, faculty, school administrators, and the community with a more organized path 
to recovery. 
In the post-Columbine era, from 2000 to 2015, there have been 27 active-shooter 
events in K-12 schools, and one event at a pre–K-12 school.55 Because this era of horrific 
events in U.S. schools has demanded more attention to emergency planning, it is from 
these examples that the research for this thesis was chosen. Although the tragic event at 
Columbine occurred prior to 2000, its relevance to changes in response, recovery, and 
crisis planning warrant its inclusion in this research. Some of the details in the following 
chapters, while intentionally not explicit by design, may be difficult to read but were 
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55 Blair and Schweit, “A Study of Active-shooter incidents”; Katherine W. Schweit, “Active-shooter 




important in the research examination, not in the sense of determining right or wrong 
actions, but in revealing methods of improvement for crisis planning.  
When considering the steady trend of active-shooter incidents in the last 20 years, 
members of the public may assume emergency planning for schools to be a standard 
practice, perhaps even regulated by state law. The simple fact is, developing a 
comprehensive emergency plan requires input from many stakeholders and requires a 
commitment by the parent institution to revise it annually and exercise the plan 
frequently. The planning process demands time and resources to prepare for an event 
every school hopes will never come. The following chapter provides more insight into the 
crisis planning process, why it is a critical need, and how state and federal government 
relationships with schools have to become an essential influence. 
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II. EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR K-12 SCHOOLS 
All-hazard emergency operations plans are comprehensive plans that take into 
consideration all threats, hazards, vulnerabilities, and consequences, and are generally 
predicated by a risk assessment of the jurisdiction for which the plan encompasses.56 
Despite government reports indicating many schools have emergency plans in place, 
research reveals many school plans do not have a strategy for action once the response 
mission is completed. A broader plan with more depth also considers all aspects of a 
disaster recovery phase.  
A. BASICS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS 
According to at least one state’s recommended planning principles, every school 
should have at a minimum an emergency crisis plan that addresses all phases of 
emergency planning: prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.57 
Other planning practices for schools are suggested in the Guide for Developing High-
Quality School Emergency Operations Plans; the guide, developed for the U.S. 
Department of Education, advises schools to create a planning team consisting of 
members from all agencies involved in response and recovery to develop the school’s 
emergency plan.58 Such a team provides for two essential considerations. First, the 
school will have buy-in from all agencies regarding the plan’s direction of responsibilities 
for all stakeholders. Second, inclusion of all entities limits gaps in the final draft of the 
plan. 
To begin the process of developing an effective emergency plan, the plan writers 
first use a risk assessment to consider which threats pose the most risk to their 
                                                 
56 Brian J. O’Connor, Dean R. Larson, and Orlando P. Hernandez, NFPA 1600 Handbook: Emergency 
Management and Continuity Programs, (Quincy, MA: NFPA, 2016). 
57 “HSEM Comprehensive School Safety Guide,” Minnesota Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management, 2011, 10, https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/hsem/mn-school-safety-center/Documents/
Comprehensive%20School%20Safety%20Guide.pdf. 
58 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency 
Operations Plans, 6. 
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stakeholders.59 A written plan illustrates which actions and resources will be needed to 
accomplish the designated objectives. A standard school emergency plan may consist of 
three parts: the basic plan, functional annexes, and threat- and hazard-specific annexes.60 
The basic plan may contain items such as the purpose, concept of operations, assignment 
of responsibilities, and plan maintenance, and it should contain the expected course of 
action for training and exercising the plan.61  
The nature of the basic plan is broad and all-encompassing so it can be 
implemented in any type of emergency. It is designed to be the framework from which all 
emergency related actions are supported. However, some specific actions common in 
disaster response and recovery will benefit from the early consideration of strategy, 
tactics, and resource acquisition. These types of actions can be accounted for in pre-
planned annexes or addendums. Annexes may include actions pertaining to lockdown 
protocols, student evacuation, family reunification, sheltering in place, student 
accountability, and hazardous chemical releases.62 Many schools may have the same or 
similar annexes; however, the planning team needs to consider all-hazards and the 
school’s particular threats to inform which annexes are necessary.  
Experience has shown it is common practice for emergency operations plans 
(EOP) to be left unopened for years following their development. The completion of a 
written emergency plan should not be treated as a box to check or one of the obstacles in 
the quest to declare the school is prepared for emergencies. Instead, it should be reviewed 
annually by the planning team or a planning committee made of a smaller sample of 
individuals from the planning team. A full plan review by the planning team should be 
completed every two years.63 A periodic peer review by someone outside the planning 
team, school, and district is also a standard practice in the emergency management 
                                                 
59 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 7. 
60 Federal Emergency Management Agency,17. 
61 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 23–27. 
62 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 28–36. 
63 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 22. 
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industry. A review process by external partners eliminates operational and procedural 
biases and provides an objective perspective.  
Another essential condition for sustaining an effective plan is exercising or 
training with it as often as practical.64 The designated planning team should consider the 
costs and benefits to the type of exercise they are considering. To provide the value 
necessary in proportion to the cost of planning and facilitating an exercise, the product 
must be of the highest quality.65 A standard practice in emergency management is to 
follow an exercise process beginning with workshops or drills with key school officials to 
reinforce their understanding of the plan. Drills or workshops are generally followed by a 
tabletop exercise, a functional exercise, and a full-scale exercise if needed. Each step’s 
purpose is to provide an evaluation of the plan’s effectiveness and its comprehension by 
the stakeholders. An after action report (AAR) written by the event’s evaluators should 
follow every event. The AAR captures the gaps in the plan and establishes an 
improvement plan to close the gaps.66 It is critical that all participants have access to the 
AAR. Schools in all regions will be best served to request the assistance of certified local 
emergency managers in designing and conducting exercise and training events.  
B. K-12 PREPAREDNESS: FEMA’S MISSIONS, SCHOOL THREATS, AND 
HAZARDS 
All schools are at risk to disaster, and many face more than one type of hazard. 
For planning purposes, most threats are categorized under one of three types of hazards: 
natural, technological, or intentional human-caused. See Table 2.67 School districts with 
comprehensive emergency preparedness programs include the application of all five 
FEMA preparedness missions. An emergency preparedness program that has all missions 
in place will have a framework in place in which all emergency support functions can be 
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applied. FEMA’s five mission areas are defined in Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: 
National Preparedness.68 The U.S. Department of Education provides adapted versions of 
the missions for schools in a 2013 guide, which was created to assist schools in plan 
development.69 The definitions from each source are presented to highlight each 
mission’s relevance to school safety. School missions taken from the guide are in italics.  
 Five Mission Areas of Preparedness from the Department of Homeland 
Security70 
 Mission Areas Adapted for Schools by the Department of Education71 
 Prevention: preventing, avoiding, or stopping a threatened or an 
actual act of terrorism.  
 Prevention: the capabilities necessary to avoid, deter, or stop an 
imminent crime or threatened or actual mass casualty incident. 
Prevention is the action schools take to prevent a threatened or 
actual incident from occurring. 
 Protection: protecting our citizens, residents, visitors, and assets 
against the greatest threats and hazards in a manner that allows our 
interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive. 
 Protection: the capabilities to secure schools against acts of 
violence and manmade or natural disasters. Protection focuses on 
ongoing actions that protect students, teachers, staff, visitors, 
networks, and property from a threat or hazard. 
 Mitigation: mitigating the loss of life and property by lessening the 
impact of future disasters. 
 Mitigation: the capabilities necessary to eliminate or reduce the 
loss of life and property damage by lessening the impact of an 
event or emergency. In this document, “mitigation” also means 
reducing the likelihood that threats and hazards will happen. 
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 Response: responding quickly to save lives, protect property and 
the environment, and meet basic human needs in the aftermath of a 
catastrophic incident. 
 Response: the capabilities necessary to stabilize an emergency 
once it has already happened or is certain to happen in an 
unpreventable way; establish a safe and secure environment; save 
lives and property/ and facilitate the transition to recovery. 
 Recovery: recovering through a focus on the timely restoration, 
strengthening, and revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and a 
sustainable economy, as well as the health, social, cultural, 
historic, and environmental fabric of communities affected by a 
catastrophic incident. 
 Recovery: the capabilities necessary to assist schools affected by 
an event or emergency in restoring the learning environment. 
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Table 2.   Threats and Hazard Types Faced by U.S. Schools.72  
Threat and Hazard Type Examples 
Natural Hazards  Earthquakes 
 Tornadoes 
 Lightning 




 Extreme temperatures 
 Landslides or mudslides 
 Tsunamis 
 Volcanic eruptions 
 Winter precipitation 
Technological Hazards  Explosions or accidental release of toxins from 
industrial plants 
 Accidental release of hazardous materials from within 
the school, such as gas leaks or laboratory spills 
 Hazardous materials releases from major highways or 
railroads 
 Radiological releases from nuclear power stations 
 Dam failure 
 Power failure 
 Water failure 
Biological Hazards  Infectious diseases, such as pandemic influenza, 
extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis, Staphylococcus 
aureus, and meningitis 
 Contaminated food outbreaks, including Salmonella, 
botulism, and E. coli 





 Active shooters 
 Criminal threats or actions 
 Gang violence 
 Bomb threats 
 Domestic violence and abuse 
 Cyber attacks 
 Suicide 
                                                 
72 Adapted from “Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide,” Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, August 2013, 6, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
8ca0a9e54dc8b037a55b402b2a269e94/CPG201_htirag_2nd_edition.pdf. 
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All schools have some level of risk to disaster, as such they need to have an EOP 
ready to be activated at any time. Without a federal requirement to have a plan, EOP 
requirements must come from the state or local level. A 2007 report from the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) provided some statistics on school district 
emergency planning that suggested the majority of schools have taken steps to prepare. 
The research showed that 32 states require schools or school districts to have EOPs.73 
Additionally, nearly 70 percent of the schools surveyed reported making improvements in 
security surrounding the school and upgrades in mechanisms for ingress.74 The results of 
the survey indicated many districts are making an effort; however, because there is not a 
national standard in place, plans were random and inconsistent and did not reflect the 
intentions of federally provided recommendations.75  
In 2014, a federally supported guide was developed by the Readiness and 
Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance (TA) Center on 
behalf of the U.S. Department of Education.76 The purpose of this guide was to provide a 
template for the development of a school EOP, a literal step-by-step process that includes 
formatting recommendations and suggestions for annexes.77 Several years following the 
guide’s release, the GAO provided another report to Congress on the current situation of 
school preparedness.78 
The 2016 GAO report did not collect the same data as the 2007 report, this fact 
does allow for an examination of school improvements over the 10-year period. Although 
it appears advances were made in overall preparedness in terms of numbers of schools 
and districts, many gaps still exist. For example, fewer than half of the states require their 
                                                 
73 Ashby, Emergency Management, 11. 
74 Ashby, 22. 
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districts or a state authority to review their school plans at least every two years.79 Only 
one-quarter of the states that require fire drills also require active-shooter drills.80 Finally, 
10 states still do not require districts or schools to have an EOP, although the report 
indicates 12 percent of the K-12 students in the country live in those states.81  
The 2016 GAO report cites federal oversight as the biggest gap; the primary 
obstacle is that there is no leading agency or authority to direct the guidance needed for 
emergency planning in schools.82 The report further states that, as a result, some agencies 
are not included in collaborative efforts to develop a formal strategy for emergency 
planning, and available guidance from the federal government is interpreted differently 
by some agencies.83 According to the GAO report, 96 percent of school districts have a 
form of doctrine for addressing the threat of active shooters to their schools.84 In 
summary, the report claims schools are inconsistent in guidance and development of 
emergency planning procedures. The lack of a comprehensive standard practice makes 
schools without a plan more vulnerable than necessary. Moreover, without a planning 
standard, school districts are prone to develop plans that do not include a recovery annex, 
thereby compounding the challenges for communities to return to normal following the 
event of an emergency.  
C. STATUS OF SCHOOL CRISIS PLANS WHEN DISASTERS STRUCK 
The research for the following section was solely to determine the status or 
existence of school crisis plans for the districts and states where the incidents in this 
sample selection occurred. Each of the schools selected experience a shooting incident 
                                                 
79 United States Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management: Improved Federal 
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Government Accountability Office, 2016), 4, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-144, 27. 
80 U. S. Government Accountability Office, 25. 
81 U. S. Government Accountability Office, 20. 
82 U. S. Government Accountability Office. 
83 U. S. Government Accountability Office. 
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causing fatalities at the school. More detail regarding the incident and additional 
background information is described further in Chapter III. 
1. Columbine High School, 1999 
Research was inconclusive in determining the status or school crisis plan 
mandates in the state of Colorado at the time of the Columbine incident. Additional 
information gleaned from the Columbine Review Commission was also not clear. 
However, in the report’s recommendations, it states that every school should have a crisis 
plan, suggesting Columbine at the time may not have.85 The report suggests that there 
was a county emergency plan but does not refer to a school- or district-specific plan.86 
The commission acknowledges in the report that an all-encompassing plan intended to 
cover many schools within the district would provide a disadvantage to school 
administrators when a disaster strikes; the thought being that no district-wide plan could 
be specific enough in its planning details to meet the needs of individual schools. Instead, 
districts need to be mindful enough in their planning to address the individual differences 
of each school such as its geographical location, its ability to facilitate emergency ingress 
and egress, and specific roles and responsibilities assigned to staff.87 The Columbine 
Review Commission also points out the age differences of students in elementary schools 
and those attending high school must be considered when developing a school’s crisis 
plan.88 A written plan supporting emergency response and recovery for seven year-olds 
will have different responsibilities than a plan supporting 16-year-olds; such a standard in 
school planning supports the review commission’s notion that a “one-size-fits-all” model 
for school planning will not work.89  
                                                 
85 “The Report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review Commission,” School Shooters Info, 
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2. Sandy Hook High School, 2012 
The 2007 GAO report on school district planning and preparedness shows the 
state of Connecticut did not require districts or schools to have emergency plans.90 In 
Chapter 7 of the Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, it states that until 
the events in Newtown, schools in the state of Connecticut responded to emergencies 
with an ad hoc approach.91 The report recommends an initiative by the state to develop a 
plan for response to major incidents; the recommendation proposes every school year 
beginning on July 1, 2014, the school board shall establish a committee to help develop a 
safety plan.92 It is further recommended by the report that relationships with agencies at 
every level of government are to be in place prior to an incident to help streamline 
recovery efforts.93  
3. Rocori High School, 2003 
At the time of the tragedy, neither Minnesota state nor federal officials were 
providing required emergency planning criteria for school crisis plans. Research has 
found there are states offering recommendations, but there are inconsistencies among all 
states. This is, of course, to be expected without a nationwide standard in place. Also, the 
comprehensiveness of the recommendations bares a wide spectrum of actions and 
strategies. The Rocori School District had acknowledged it was in compliance with the 
Minnesota education system requirement to have a crisis plan.94 A Minnesota state 
statute requires the school board to adopt a crisis management policy to address the 
potential for violent events.95 Returning to the argument regarding the robustness of 
recommendations, the Minnesota statute requires the crisis management policy to include 
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only five lock-down drills and five fire drills per year.96 There is no verbiage within the 
statute referencing recovery guidelines for the development of evacuation procedures, 
identification of relocation facilities, or student/parent reunification.  
In 1999, the Minnesota Department of Public Safety in collaboration with the 
Minnesota Department of Education released the first draft of the Comprehensive School 
Safety Guide.97 Since then, there have been four revisions, with the most recent in 2011. 
The guide is a 145-page document providing a thorough overview of the criteria needed 
to develop an effective crisis plan that address all phases of emergency preparedness, 
including recovery.98 At issue is the implementation by districts of this available 
guidance. Currently, no part of the Minnesota statute requires planning practices found in 
the comprehensive guide separate from that of fire drills and lockdown drills. 
4. Marysville-Pilchuck High School, 2014 
The 2007 GAO report indicates the state of Washington requires districts to have 
emergency management plans in place.99 On the day of the shooting at Marysville 
Pilchuck High School, the superintendent of the Seattle School District—an hour south of 
Marysville—drafted a message to all school staff, families, and the community.100 The 
message by the superintendent references state law requiring monthly safety drills during 
the school year. Additionally, he references every school as having a plan; however, this 
statement is vague in that it does not distinguish between his district and all districts 
within the state.101  
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5. Chardon High School, 2012 
Evidence for school crisis-planning mandates for Ohio is conflicting. The GAO 
report from 2007 highlights the state of Ohio on a nationwide map as requiring all 
districts and schools to have emergency management plans.102 Conversely, Chapter 3313 
of the Ohio Administrative Code indicates Code 3313.536, School Emergency Plans, as 
being effective on 9/17/2014.103 William Steele’s book about trauma in schools devotes a 
chapter to the events that took place at Chardon High School. In his book, he clearly 
states that Chardon did not have a recovery plan or a crisis team at the time of the 
shooting.104 Other reports found during research indicate that some planning measures 
such as lockdown drills had been happening prior to the event.105 As a result of the 
conflicting evidence, confirmation as to whether Chardon High School had a formal 
emergency operations plan in place was inconclusive. 
6. Santana High School, 2001 
Santana High School, as part of the Grossmont Union High School District 
outside San Diego, California, has been required to have a crisis plan in place since 
1997.106 Research for the Santana incident was only able to yield news articles that were 
released after the incident. A Los Angeles Times article released one day following the 
incident stated that, as part of the California “safe schools plan,” California law requires 
all school emergency plans to be updated every year.107 Research could not produce 
evidence of any plans outlining protocols for relocation, reunification, or a structured 
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recovery; however, parent and student reunification was established at a mall across the 
street from the school.108 A command center was established at the shopping center 
adjacent to the school; this also became the media-staging area.109 A New York Times 
article reported that the school had arranged for 200 mental health counselors to be 
available at the school when students returned just days after the shooting.110 
D. SUMMARY 
The core of basic emergency planning principles is well known, clearly 
articulated, and available in the public open-source arena. The building blocks for a solid 
planning foundation is a basic plan that touches all missions and considers all threats, 
hazards, and risks. Schools recognizing the value of a comprehensive preparedness plan 
and taking the steps to implement it are in a better position to recover from disaster than 
their counterparts preparing for the minimum.  
The research for the six samples was consistent: specific details pertaining to all 
the selected schools’ recovery operations were limited in the public forum. Schools in 
which some form of a plan was purportedly in place at the time of the active-shooter 
event were still not forthcoming publicly about the depth of their plans. To generalize the 
research group, specific details regarding the state of emergency readiness at the time of 
the shooting incident are either nonexistent or held internally and not made available as 
open-source material. In some cases, basic levels of preparedness such as lockdown drills 
and a relocation site were provided publicly. To understand this deeper, further inquiry 
into the events of the incident, the challenges faced by the school administrators and the 
lessons learned from experience must be examined.  
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III. ACTIVE-SHOOTER INCIDENTS 
Each individual school and school district is at some level of risk to an active-
shooter incident. Where the next incident will occur is at the assailant’s discretion; the 
choice may or may not be random. The point is, intentionally inflicted evil is not reserved 
only for the rich or impoverished communities; it is not just directed toward large or 
small populations nor is it directed specifically at one single race or region of the country. 
An active-shooter event may happen anywhere, thus a school’s preparedness should 
never be left to chance. 
The following pages illustrate the events that took place at the six schools selected 
for review for this thesis. These schools are diverse in many ways, as noted earlier, yet 
they are the same in that they experienced a tragedy. How they differ is by their response 
and recovery. The accounts, as informed by the research, are described through details of 
the incident and each school’s subsequent response and recovery efforts.  
The samples selected reinforce the assertion that an active-shooter incident can 
happen at any school, in any city. Table 3 illustrates the differences in school district 
population, median house income, and median house values. 
Table 3.   Geographic Data for School District Population111 
National Center for Education Statistics 
American Community Survey 2010–2014 






Columbine * 94,990 $61,026 $196,600 
Sandy Hook 27,960 $108,667 $417,000 
Rocori ** 83,267 $40,604 $159,200 
Marysville 71,032 $65,251 N/A 
Santana ** 438,500 $54,438 $486,600 
Chardon 21,575 $68,413 $213,700 
* Information was derived from the 2000 Census 
** Information was derived from the 2005 Census 
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Programs/EDGE/demographic.aspx. 
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A. COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL 
About 10 miles south of Denver is the town of Littleton, Colorado. In the1998-
1999 school year, 1,900 students from Littleton and several surrounding communities 
attended Columbine High School.112 The high school is just one of 17 high schools in the 
Jefferson County School District, of which there were 144 total schools in the K-12 
system in 1999.113 Columbine High School has more than 75 classrooms and boasts a 
floor plan of over 250,000 square feet, a fact that was critical to law enforcement’s 
response.114  
1. Incident  
In April 1999, the city of Littleton, Colorado became a high-profile city in only a 
matter of hours. On April 20, 1999, two gunmen executed a horrific attack upon their 
fellow classmates at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. They had been 
planning the attack for a year.115 The attackers were both seniors. According to 
homemade videos by the attackers and thousands of pages of evidence reviewed by the 
commission, the two seniors devised a plan to kill as many of their classmates as 
possible.116 
The initial plan began with the placement of two 20-pound propane bombs in the 
cafeteria. The expectation was that the blasts from the bombs would kill many of the 500 
students in the cafeteria. Following the explosion, the attackers would begin shooting 
their classmates as they fled the attack.117 The two seniors came prepared to kill. In their 
possession that day were 29 pipe bombs, 48 carbon dioxide bombs, two sawed-off 
shotguns, a 9mm semi-automatic pistol, and a 9mm semi-automatic carbine rifle.118 
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Fortunately, the plan began with a failure; the propane bombs set to explode via 
automatic timers failed due to improper wiring.119 
Upon noticing the cafeteria bombs failed to explode, the assailants abandoned 
their staging position in the parking lot and advanced toward the school. It was at this 
point that gunshots were heard and the assault on students began. After killing and 
wounding several outside the school cafeteria, the shooters entered the building, 
continuing their assault. They soon made their way to the library, where ten more 
innocent bystanders were subsequently murdered.120 The commission report cites 
witness testimony that the shooters taunted many of the victims in the library. Upon 
leaving the library, the two assailants made their way to the science room area on the 
second floor. They moved about the school unrestricted, returning to the cafeteria several 
times before finally taking their own lives in the library.121 
2. Challenges/Issues 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the Columbine High School shooting became the 
watershed moment for changes in the emergency management planning approach to 
school-related active-shooter planning. In all areas—response, recovery, mitigation, and 
prevention—adjustments were made and a new focus was applied to active-shooter 
planning and training by public safety agencies.122 As such, the incident at Columbine is 
where this research begins.  
The school attack, although not the first of its kind in the United States, was the 
first to draw live national media attention in real time. Several hours passed before law 
enforcement was able to secure the building, and because of the delay news cameras had 
arrived and captured live video of the rescue tactics deployed by law enforcement.123 In 
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1998, during a span of three months and only one year prior to Columbine, there were 
four other school shootings in which six students and two teachers were killed, and 36 
were wounded.124 The threat of active-shooter violence in K-12 schools was not new, but 
the reality of such a crisis was now thrust into the prime-time view of American 
households.  
In 1999 live coverage of breaking news stories was becoming mainstream due to 
broader cable television audiences. Television viewers were no longer limited to the three 
major networks; this opened the door for fledgling news agencies providing a means to 
bring breaking news to the nation on a first-come basis.125 At this point in media history, 
the drama of Columbine unfolding live on television was inescapable. A total of eleven 
school shootings in the 1990s prior to Columbine still had not prepared America for what 
they witnessed unfolding live on April 20.126 It was the extreme amount of time that it 
took for law enforcement to assemble and make entry into the building that provided 
media the time it needed to set up on scene and broadcast the event on television. It was 
the same span of time that would generate much discussion concerning reform in active-
shooter response.127 
Post-event discussion surrounding the actions of police focused on response 
protocols that were perceived to be ineffective; however, the commission report 
comments that witnesses providing statements to the commission believe police 
responded according to their current level of training.128 Additionally, law enforcement 
encountered obstacles they were not prepared for, such as dozens of unexploded bombs 
impeding their paths to clear corridors and classrooms.129 Also, SWAT officers 
responding from areas not within Littleton city limits had little or no familiarity with the 
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school floor plan. This, combined with communication challenges, fueled the chaos.130 
These obstacles identified in the commission report contributed to the delay of law 
enforcement finding and extricating all the victims. It is not the intent of this sampling 
research to call into question the effectiveness of law enforcement’s response to 
Columbine; it is rather to provide an accurate account of events that had a major 
influence on future active-shooter planning preparedness.  
The commission report states that on the day of the tragedy, Columbine school 
officials did not have a crisis plan in place.131 The Jefferson County school security 
officer also has publicly stated Columbine did not have a crisis plan, a position that is 
disputed by Jefferson County school officials.132 The Jefferson County emergency 
management plan had already been revised by the time the commission report was 
published. The report explains that the exact content for crisis plan criteria is contested by 
school and outside officials. The focal point of concern is that there is not a universal 
emergency or crisis plan, and that schools within a district could have significant 
differences within their geographic setting, demographics, or operational structure.133 
Thus, district-wide plans may not be comprehensive enough to provide necessary detail 
that is specific to every school; therefore, each school should possess its own plan.134  
With or without a plan, students were escorted off campus and subsequently 
bussed to Leawood Elementary School to be reunited with their parents.135 Authorities 
used the media to inform parents to pick up their children at the elementary school.136 
Students at the elementary school were escorted to the gymnasium to be reunited with 
their parents.137 The report indicates that personnel were requested to go to the 
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elementary school to provide victim support, but it does not clarify what credentials or 
professional training these individuals had in immediate post-disaster counseling. 
Recovery will eventually happen, but a comprehensive plan in place prior to the event 
will reduce the challenges faced by responders and recovery coordinators.  
All research indicates that Columbine did not have a plan for a long-term school 
closing. Students from Columbine were out of school for two weeks, many used that time 
to cope with the trauma, begin the emotional healing process, and attend funerals of 
friends and classmates. The district needed an ad hoc plan to get the students back in 
school and help the seniors graduate on time. The decision was made to move all 1,900 
Columbine students to their archrival Chatfield High School for what would be a daily 
split schedule. Chatfield students would attend class from 7 am to 12:10 pm, and 
Columbine students would attend class from 12:50 pm to 6 pm.138 
Part of working through the recovery process is moving toward a new normal, 
whatever that normal may look like. For the nearly doubled population of students 
attending Chatfield High School in the middle of May 1999, it meant that the parking lot 
needed to be cleared in 15 minutes so the afternoon students could come in.139 It also 
meant that the Columbine students forced to leave their backpacks at the crime scene had 
to carry all their textbooks and subject notebooks to every class for the remainder of the 
year; because the school had essentially doubled in size, there were not enough lockers 
for all.140 Experiences of other schools involved in shooting events demonstrates a need 
for school districts to address in their crisis planning what an entire student body 
relocation would look like for both short- and long-term. It is a consideration that is 
practical for all types of disasters, not just active-shooter incidents.  
Columbine became the benchmark for tragic scenarios that form the base for 
emergency planning. Some schools and districts in the wake of Columbine reacted 
quickly by incorporating planning solutions to some of the challenges faced by 
                                                 




Columbine officials. Other districts, for a litany of reasons, did not address creating or 
revising their crisis plans, or simply let the priority of such a task fade with the memory 
of the Columbine events. The Columbine commission report repeatedly emphasizes the 
importance of pre-crisis planning. 
B. SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 
With fewer than 30,000 residents, the town of Newtown, Connecticut, could be 
considered a small town. The Newtown School District operates seven K-12 schools with 
a total 2015/2016 student population of 4,588.141 Sandy Hook is one of four K-4 
elementary schools in the district.142 Its student enrollment during the year of the attack 
was 512.143 In December 2012, Sandy Hook Elementary school and all its community 
members were thrust into the international spotlight when a lone gunman committed an 
inconceivable violent crime, leaving dozens slain. 
1. Incident 
The following are details of the shooting as reported by the Sandy Hook Advisory 
Committee in its Final Report. The subsequent description is paraphrased from the report. 
On the morning of December 14, 2012, the mother of a 20-year-old man known to have 
emotional difficulties was slain in her own bed while sleeping. The gunman collected 
multiple weapons owned by his mother, including a semi-automatic assault type rifle, two 
semi-automatic hand guns, and a shotgun. All weapons taken were the legal property of 
the gunman’s mother.  
Immediately following the murder of his mother in her home in Newtown, the 
gunman drove to Sandy Hook Elementary School, also in Newtown. Upon arriving, he 
shot out the window immediately adjacent to the front doors, which were locked at the 
time. Hearing the shots that allowed the gunman to breach the building were two 
                                                 
141 “District Reports,” Newtown Public School District, February 24, 2017, 
http://newtown.schooldesk.net/DistrictInformation/DistrictReports/tabid/98651/Default.aspx. 
142 “Sandy Hook Elementary School in Sandy Hook, Connecticut,” Startclass, accessed September 
24, 2017, http://public-schools.startclass.com/l/17947/Sandy-Hook-Elementary-School. 
143 “Sandy Hook Elementary School,” SchoolDigger, accessed October 11, 2017, 
https://www.schooldigger.com/go/CT/schools/0291000617/school.aspx. 
 40
administrative staff members who entered the hallway to investigate. Both staff members 
were shot dead; one was the school principal. The shooter then entered the main office 
and did not attempt to search for possible victims. Staff members in the office at the time 
were hiding. The shooter left the office, headed for classrooms 8 and 10. 
The shooter first entered room 8, where he found two staff members and 16 first 
graders. After firing 80 cartridges from his 223-caliber rifle, both staff members and 14 
students lay dead, another from classroom 8 died later. One student from room 8 
survived. The shooter left to go to room 10, where he found two more staff members and 
killed them along with five more first graders. This time however, nine students were 
able to escape and two remained in the room physically uninjured; this occurred about the 
same time law enforcement entered the building. The investigation led law enforcement 
to believe that upon hearing responders coming into the building, the shooter then turned 
one of his handguns on himself. He died in room 10 from one gunshot.144 
In January 2013, 16 members of a newly formed commission were tasked with 
the challenge of identifying better policy in the areas of safe school operations, public 
safety, and mental health awareness in order to reduce the risk of another active-shooter 
event.145 The formation of the commission established by the Connecticut governor 
follows the unprecedented tragic events of December 14, 2012.  
2. Challenges/Issues 
In the immediate aftermath of the arrival of first responders, Sandy Hook needed 
a plan to evacuate and reunify students. Unfortunately, there was no such plan in 
place.146 Families rushing to the school after hearing the news could only get as close as 
the firehouse located at the end of the driveway to the school. It was there that 
reunifications were happening for some families. Mostly what was happening there was 
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chaos.147 Children, parents, school staff, and first responders were all milling about with 
no structured purpose. Children were being taken home by well-meaning neighbors or in 
some cases other family members. Parents of those students were arriving and finding no 
information or record as to the location or release of their child.148 The operations 
lending to the recovery of Sandy Hook families were more than 13 years removed from 
the lessons learned at Columbine, yet there was no plan to help facilitate the process. 
Up until the time of the events that unfolded at Sandy Hook Elementary School, 
crisis resolution was conducted ad hoc. This was the case not only with Sandy Hook, but 
across the entire state.149 Again, with or without a plan, recovery will happen. With the 
best interest of the children of Sandy Hook Elementary school in mind, the administration 
made the decision to try and return the students’ environment back to normal, or as 
normal as possible.150 To accomplish this they had to get them back in school. Meetings 
began the day after the shooting between Newtown school administrators, federal and 
state officials, and officials from the nearby town of Monroe to find a new location for 
the students to continue school instruction. An agreement was made to use Chalk Hill 
Elementary School, which had been closed following the 2010/2011 school year.151 The 
building was currently a multipurpose site hosting the city’s Parks and Recreation 
department, a day-care facility, and a training center for local emergency medical 
services; however, it was determined to be adequate space to house the additional 
students and the faculty from Sandy Hook.152 The students were back in school the 
Tuesday following the shooting.  
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Knowing that the temporary student placement at Monroe Elementary was not a 
long-term solution, Newtown First Selectman Patricia Llodra began to consider possible 
alternatives. Just a few weeks following the disaster, the slow process of discussing 
options began with those that were ready; for many others, more time was needed to 
come to grips with the reality of the past event. Without a plan in place and no committee 
structures to lean on for recovery planning, Llodra built a task force consisting of a 
private consulting firm and more than two dozen local citizens serving on town 
boards.153 The decision was made to move forward with the construction of a new 
school; it would be designed with the lessons learned from the past in mind, in 
conjunction with the innocence of the ones lost in the tragedy.154  
Of the six events that make up the sampling research of this study, the assault on 
the victims at Sandy Hook Elementary stands out. For victims trying to return their lives 
to normal following an active-shooter incident, mental health recovery is arguably the 
longest process of all the recovery phases. As such it warrants high-priority consideration 
when building a recovery plan. Many of the recommendations found in the commission 
report contain an element of behavioral and mental health recovery. The report is explicit 
in suggesting state requirements that can be tied to licensing and/or certification renewals 
for teachers and personnel.155 Details of what suggested mandates may include contain 
trainings for teachers such as psychological first aid, bereavement support, and skills in 
identifying signs indicating the need for added mental health services.156 
In 2016, the Newtown School District opened the new Sandy Hook Elementary 
School. To facilitate the recovery of the community and more directly the families of 
Sandy Hook, the decision was made to demolish the old school and rebuild a new one. 
The state of Connecticut contributed $50 million to the project.157 Expensive and large 
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construction projects are sometimes part of the recovery process. In the case of 
Columbine High School, the entire library was relocated and an atrium above the 
cafeteria was constructed.158 In both cases, the idea is to help those directly affected to 
find closure in their quest for a new normal. In the end, recovery will happen. 
C. ROCORI HIGH SCHOOL 
The Rocori School District in west-central Minnesota serves the communities of 
Rockville, Cold Spring, and Richmond. The district derives its name from the first two 
initials of each community.159 It operates three elementary schools, three parochial 
schools, a middle school and the high school, all within its 127-square-mile 
boundaries.160  
1. Incident 
Students and staff were only weeks into the 2003–2004 school year when disaster 
struck at Rocori High School in Cold Spring, Minnesota. Around midday, shots were 
heard. A freshman student had shot one student in the locker room and proceeded to 
shoot another classmate in the gymnasium. One student died shortly after arriving at the 
hospital, the other died several weeks later.161 The shooter surrendered his weapon when 
confronted by a teacher. Classmates interviewed by news agencies told reporters they 
believed the shooter began to withdraw from friends the summer before the start of 
school. Others believed he had been bullied in the past, presumably about his acne.162 
Research regarding details of the shooting could not determine if the victims were 
selected randomly. 
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2. Challenges/Issues 
Following the release of the lockdown, the process for the evacuation of students 
began. Admittedly, Rocori officials did not have this procedure identified in their plan. 
As a result, there was not an institutionally understood process for faculty to be certain if 
it was safe to open their locked doors.163 A well-known process understood by faculty 
may have expedited the process. Following the evacuation, students were brought to the 
elementary school to be reunified with their parents. Without having specifics in the 
emergency plan for this process, the school used faculty to help identify parents with 
students to authorize their release.164 This was a more or less ad-hoc process that was 
effective, but may have been accomplished with less resistance with a plan that included 
forms, procedures, etc.  
The short-term recovery for Rocori was focused on resuming classes quickly to 
foster a sense of normalcy, and the emotional impact of the incident on students and 
faculty. Multiple meetings were conducted to allow staff to have an open discussion 
pertaining to the events and to ask questions among themselves. Community meetings 
were also offered; parents and residents were invited to discuss changes that would 
address prevention measures to be considered by the district, improvements in planning, 
and the strength of their values within the community. Counseling opportunities were 
also offered for school staff, students and families, and members of the community. 
District officials were clear and open about their support for the teachers and staff at the 
school.165 
The Rocori School District received federal school emergency assistance as a 
result of the incident. As a requirement of the assistance, the district needed to develop 
plans for long-term recovery. The district focused on three individual components:166 
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 Conduct a survey of the district and community residents to garner 
concerns or ideas on various topics.  
 Enable an assessment of school facilities to contemplate the safety and 
security aspect for long-term planning. 
 Develop a strategy for the district to navigate the recovery process.  
Research has revealed consistencies in the actions needed to be taken by districts 
following a shooting event. As is the case with any crisis event, the existence of a 
detailed plan will help facilitate an organized path to recovery. Of course, every step 
cannot be outlined; however, generalizations that will provide situational awareness for 
expectations of known actions to be taken, as determined from experiences gleaned from 
previous events, can be of significant value to the plan owner.  
D. MARYSVILLE-PILCHUCK HIGH SCHOOL  
The Marysville-Pilchuck High School resides in the city of Marysville, 
Washington. The school is adjacent to the city of Marysville; the Tulalip Tribes of 
Washington are also served by the high school. Marysville-Pilchuck High School is part 
of an open enrollment district; students have the choice of which high school to attend 
and communities are not restricted by district or city boundaries when determining where 
their kids would attend school in the 2014–2015 school year.167 The high school serves 
students in grades 9 through 12, with an enrollment of approximately 1,200 students and 
60 teachers.168 
1. Incident 
On the morning of October 14, 2014, a freshman at Marysville-Pilchuck High 
School asked several of his friends to eat lunch with him later that day. Several of them 
had to cut class to be there at their friend’s request. Once all of them arrived and had 
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taken a seat, the shooter removed a handgun from his backpack, stood up, and began 
shooting his friends one at time in the head. He shot five of his friends; four of them died. 
Upon emptying his weapon of ammunition, he reloaded the gun and turned it on himself; 
the bullet entered under his chin killing him instantly.169 Two of his friends at the table 
survived the event without any physical injury and were able to provide investigators 
with details of the events.170 
2. Challenges/Issues 
The students needed to be evacuated from the school; they were relocated to the 
Shoultes Community Church. Automated phone calls were sent to parents identifying 
where they can pick up their children.171 Soon after the shooting, the decision was made 
to close the school the following week.172 Research has revealed, in general, schools do 
not have a predetermined plan for how long they will close due to a crisis. Every school 
approaches the issue independently with the welfare of the students in mind. Some 
schools choose to return immediately to instill a feeling of normalcy.  
As seen in other active-shooter recoveries such as Columbine and Sandy Hook, 
Marysville High School would undergo some building remodeling. What is generally 
aimed at the mental health stability and recovery of students and staff, the destruction or 
reconstruction of the area most associated with the identity of the shooting helps to 
signify a new beginning. In the case of the Marysville shooting incident, the cafeteria was 
slated for change, as this is where the shooting event unfolded.173 Another change was 
implemented following the shooting to help curb the flood of memories from the 
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shooting—a change was made to the fire alarm tones throughout the school.174 After the 
sound of gunfire was heard, someone had pulled the fire alarm alerting those that could to 
evacuate. The new alarm sound is intended to disassociate the warning system with the 
events that occurred on that day. These are all important recovery processes that are 
nowhere determined to have come from a crisis emergency plan. Research was unable to 
determine what level of planning was in place at Marysville-Pilchuck High School in 
September 2014, or whether or not any written plans had been trained on, exercised, or 
understood by faculty and staff.  
As gleaned from years of experience in the field of emergency management, 
oftentimes when a major incident occurs that includes response by public safety, one or 
several participating disciplines may complete an after action report (AAR) to capture the 
details of the response to a specific event. The document is used to provide an analysis of 
operations that can be compared to the response plans intended for use in said type of 
incident. The AAR is regarded in emergency management circles as a means to identify 
strengths and weaknesses, and consequently develop a plan for making improvements on 
identified gaps.175 The AAR is not intended to assign blame; it is merely a quality 
improvement tool.  
In the case of Marysville-Pilchuck, there was not an AAR developed by police 
that could shed light on the processes used for evacuation, relocation, or any other 
recovery measures that police were associated with. In a June 2015 article published by 
the Seattle Times it was clearly stated by Commander Robb Lamoureux that an unofficial 
conversation by officers and SWAT team members would suffice. In an email referenced 
by the Times Lamoureux wrote, “It was an informal round-table discussion only and no 
formal report has been, nor will be, completed.”176 Although the tragic circumstances at 
Marysville was a local event, the lessons learned there could be of value to every district 
nationwide. Active-shooter incidents in K-12 schools by the numbers would be 
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considered by most to be a rare event; it is a lost opportunity when a high consequence-
event is not documented for the benefit of responding jurisdictions and those charged 
with the safety and protection of children at school. 
E. CHARDON HIGH SCHOOL 
The city of Chardon is located in the northeastern portion of Ohio near Lake Erie, 
about 30 miles east of Cleveland. The city’s population at the time of the shooting was 
nearly 5,000 residents.177 The Chardon School District represents the city of Chardon 
along with five other surrounding communities, a district footprint covering 88 square 
miles. The district operates four elementary schools, one middle school, and one high 
school—Chardon High School. The high school serves 1,100 students in grades 9 
through 12.178  
1. Incident 
On February 27, 2012, School was just getting underway at Chardon High School 
in Chardon, Ohio, when a 17-year-old student opened fire on other students in the school 
cafeteria. The shooter, acting alone, brandished a .22-caliber handgun and fatally shot 
three students in the backs of their heads.179 Two other students were shot in the hallway 
as the gunman fled; one was hit in the buttocks, and the other was shot in the spine.180 
The shooter exited the school while being chased by the football team’s offensive 
coordinator. Police found him in the woods near the school 45 minutes later, with the 
assistance of police K-9 units.  
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2. Challenges/Issues 
The school had begun active shooter–type training just three years prior to the 
incident.181 As of March 2007, the state of Ohio required the development of a 
comprehensive emergency management plan for every school district. Individual schools 
were required to include a floor plan specific to every building and include every floor of 
said building.182 Chardon High School had a plan, and on that tragic morning the plan 
went into effect when the public-address system informed students and teachers to initiate 
lockdown procedures.183  
The crisis plan called for faculty and staff to be responsible for student 
accountability and to physically escort them from the parking lot to reunify them with 
their parents.184 Because the incident occurred so early in the school day, the adjacent 
elementary school was not yet occupied. Officials at the scene determined that the 
elementary school would be a better site for reunification; they made the decision to 
deviate from the crisis plan and made the change on the spot.185 This fact provides a 
good example of allowing responsible parties the flexibility to make adjustments to a 
plan. Every plan when tested, whether through real events or exercises, will reveal gaps 
and areas for improvement. It should be expected that some gaps may be identified in the 
midst of operations.  
Chardon students took it upon themselves to begin the recovery process the 
evening of the shooting. Over 100 students assembled in Chardon Square to sing songs 
and stand together honoring those lost and injured in the day’s events.186 The district, 
motivated by the desire to invoke a return to normalcy, made the decision that school 
would open on Thursday, three days following the incident. Classes would resume on 
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Friday, allowing Wednesday to be a day for emotional healing with grief counselors for 
teachers and staff. Thursday was offered for students and families to go and have an 
opportunity to speak to counselors.187 No school will find every answer to the problems 
faced by their current crisis; however, Chardon’s difficult experience may have been 
tempered because of their efforts in exercising and training for an active-shooter crisis.  
F. SANTANA HIGH SCHOOL  
Santana High School is in the City of Santee, California, and located about 18 
miles northeast of San Diego. During the school year of 2000/2001, Santana High School 
had a student population of approximately 1,900.188 Oversight of the K-12 education 
system is split between two districts: Santee School District encompasses all K-8 schools, 
and Grossmont Union High School District serves the 9–12 schools.189  
1. Incident 
On a Monday morning in early March 2001, Santana High School located in the city 
of Santee became the focus of the nation’s attention on another school active-shooter 
incident. At 9:22 a.m., a high school freshman exited a restroom and began shooting at a 
crowd of hundreds of students. When it was over, two students were dead and 13 others 
were wounded, 11 of which were also students.190 
2. Challenges/Issues 
Since 1997, the state of California has required schools to write an emergency 
plan and submit it to the state.191 Since the requirement, Santana High School and the 
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Grossmont Union District have taken steps toward preparedness to put their schools and 
district in a position to cope with this type of emergency. It was only several months prior 
to the incident when two district employees participated in a workshop sponsored by 
California’s Safe Schools and Violence and Prevention Office.192 Research pertaining to 
the Chardon shooting incident revealed news sources that reported improvements in 
Santana’s readiness, including the addition of unarmed security guards, two-way radios, 
and a new system for students to report suspicious behavior or activity.193 
The data that is publicly available for the recovery process during the Santana 
incident is fragmented. This may be due to its getting lost over the 16 years since its 
occurrence or the fact that it lives in the shadows of the shooting incident at Columbine 
High School, which occurred less than two years prior. Either way, the actions taken can 
and should be used as lessons. Reports suggest parents and students were reunited across 
the street from the school at a nearby mall.194 School administration and law 
enforcement gathered across the street at a fast-food restaurant. Without the plan that was 
in place that day, it is impossible to say if these locations were pre-planned. Santana did 
pull together quickly; the night of the shooting the school assembled a meeting for 
parents and included the public safety stakeholders and school administrators. As a 
group, they were able to provide assurances of actions being taken and resources that 
would be immediately forthcoming. The students returned to school two days after the 
shooting. That day was delegated in its entirety to talk among each other and with any of 
the hundreds of mental health crisis counselors available throughout the school.195  
G. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The samples chosen for this research were selected for several reasons. First, they 
span all regions of the country. It does not appear that any part of the country is immune 
from an active shooter type of tragedy. Second, the incidents range in a span of over 14 
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years. This timespan downplays the argument that awareness of the threat of an active-
shooter scenario prohibited policy makers from incorporating a requirement for 
comprehensive emergency management crisis planning. Third, all samples reviewed 
included events with fatalities. This was done intentionally to put emphasis on the mental 
health component and stress the point that recovery from school-affiliated active-shooter 
events often takes years. Finally, a broad spectrum of district population density is 
represented in the samples. The size of the district was considered in the selection process 
to determine if population is a factor to community impact resulting from the shootings 
and the mental health resiliency as compared to small and large communities. 
Multiple academic and open source databases were thoroughly reviewed for 
information relating to the sample events. Research data available in the public realm was 
limited in its availability. The author’s conclusion for this fact is three-fold. First, schools 
that have not planned, trained, or exercised their intended actions for an active-shooter 
event are more likely to have negative experiences during real life crises. This is the core 
principle for states requiring fire drills in schools. The general understanding is that a 
practiced procedure becomes ingrained by repetition; when a real event takes place, the 
correct action is instinctive.  
Second, research revealed some public safety agencies do not engage in the 
practice of developing AARs. The AAR is known to most emergency managers and is 
commonplace in the fire service as well as other public safety disciplines and the 
military.196 Every active-shooter event researched in this thesis included response by 
police, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS). If public safety agencies are 
producing an AAR for internal use only, a recommendation for those agencies is to 
entertain formal requests for watered-down versions or simply make those versions 
publicly available with personal identifiable information redacted. So much preparedness 
planning is based on the value of lessons learned; the information gleaned from previous 
events is invaluable to all stakeholders’ success in coping with the next event. This 
                                                 




applies to the knowledge of both positive and negative experiences. Because crisis 
planning inherently brings schools and public safety agencies to the same table, the 
practice of writing AARs for training, drills, and exercises should become a standard 
practice for schools.  
Finally, it may be difficult for some agencies to request a self-critique of their 
performance. In some cases, the individual with the authority to require a documented 
history of events or actions may well be the person responsible for the event’s outcome. 
A good example of this is in fire reports for line-of-duty deaths. In general, these reports 
point to actions taken by an agency that were outside of protocol or there are common 
industry practices or strategies that were not performed by said agency. In either case, the 
introspective lens of observation is difficult when the details are negative. Nonetheless, 
agencies need to see the greater good; every incident provides opportunities for all to 
improve. The information gleaned from these samples will do just that.  
H. SYNTHESIZING THE SAMPLES 
Research, experience, and general reasoning informs us that immediate reactions 
to emergency crisis is often chaotic and unorganized. As a firefighter for 22 years, I have 
found validity in the expression describing an incident commander’s strategic approach 
to emergencies: actions taken in the first five minutes will determine the level of success 
in the next five hours. This thought process is founded on the principle that our ability to 
cope with disasters is often guided by our experience with them and/or the planning and 
training we have done to prepare for them. When observed from a distance, the actions 
and reactions to the samples selected for this research validate that simple thought 
process.  
From a holistic view of the samples, research identified consistencies in priorities 
for the recovery process. Of course, all details as applied to each phase of recovery were 
not available; however, from what we can see there are lessons to be gleaned. Although 
not the first phase of recovery, relocation and reunification were critical components to 
every school’s recovery. Research revealed half the schools had a plan for this and half 
did not, and one changed their plan in mid-operation because a better option became 
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available.197 Also consistent throughout the samples—attention to mental health became 
a high priority. Whether plans were in place or not, attention to the emotional well-being 
of students, faculty, and in some cases first responders was consistently documented as a 
concern. All schools took immediate action to address the mental health issue. Finally, 
every school had to determine when to resume class. This priority was complicated 
slightly because some schools were confronted with demolition, construction, or 
remodeling to complete before students could return to class. The element that remained 
the same was the determination of getting the students back into class; this was fostered 
by the notion of whatever is best for the students.  
I. CONCLUSION 
Schools within the K-12 system have not been fully prepared to execute the 
recovery mission process. The reason is because of a lack in recovery planning caused by 
several influences. First, there is a gap in oversight requiring schools to implement 
comprehensive recovery plans that include all phases of recovery. Second, emergency 
and crisis planning to the level of active-shooter preparedness is not inherent in the 
culture of school administration’s strategic attention. Effective preparedness for active-
shooter events in K-12 schools may require federal, state, or local mandates for 
comprehensive planning. Partnerships with public safety and emergency management is 
needed to assist in the development of such plans.  
In all of the samples examined in this thesis, the recovery process was 
accomplished. However, in some cases not all of the phases of recovery were tested. The 
examples demonstrated priorities such as student/parent reunification and mental health 
counseling as a staple for every school-related shooting event. However, since the degree 
of loss cannot be anticipated, all phases of recovery must be planned for, including 
donations management, social media surge, funerals/memorials, and extended school 
closures.  
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IV. PHASES OF RECOVERY PLANNING 
An effective recovery plan goes far beyond predetermining a relocation site and 
informing parents where to go. Research into the selected samples directs the recovery 
lens to phases of recovery that occur days, weeks, and in some cases years post-incident. 
To construct a comprehensive recovery annex, it is essential to form an understanding of 
all recovery phases and their respective nuances.  
A. RECOVERY—WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? 
The term “recovery” has many meanings in many different types of contexts. The 
“National Response Framework” describes recovery as the capabilities communities must 
have to recover from a crisis event in an effective manner.198 Recovery is the process by 
which government agencies at all levels, including volunteer organizations and private 
businesses, work together to bring communities hit by disaster to their same preexisting 
status prior to the crisis, or as close to it as possible, as efficiently and expeditiously as 
possible.199 Most notably, it is a process. In most cases it can be viewed as a process of 
operations, such as donation management, crisis therapy and mental health counseling, 
sheltering, family assistance and reunification, and reconstruction.200 For the purposes of 
this paper, recovery is about resiliency. It is the process by which we try to return all 
aspects to their prior state, before the incident; it is the effort to return to normal, or as 
close to it as possible. For the purpose of active-shooter planning, recovery begins the 
moment law enforcement has eliminated the threat or has confirmed the threat no longer 
exists; its many phases may continue for years.  
A GAO report from 2007 states that the Department of Education, the Department 
of Homeland Security, and the Department of Human Services have provided 
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recommendations for school districts to use in their emergency planning.201 In the report, 
recovery related recommendations are limited. The recommendations are vague and do 
not provide detail. One recommendation suggests all schools should include procedures 
for recovering from an incident.202 Although emergency practices indicate this to be 
good advice, it provides little insight to districts not accustomed to a nexus of emergency 
planning. The report also states that over half of the districts participating in the survey 
with written plans in place include items such as on-site trauma teams, damage 
assessment, and restoring administration operations; however, the report does not provide 
any data regarding the number of schools having components in their crisis plan that 
should include donation management, procedures to dispense medication to relocated 
students, or a plan for school administrators to interface with first responders when a 
crisis occurs.203 The report does state that few schools have plans or procedures in place 
should a disaster force an extended school closure.204 Recommendations for how to 
reunite students with parents, how to achieve school computer network interoperability 
from remote locations, or strategies to provide death notifications were not found in the 
report. A school emergency planning guide developed with collaboration from several 
federal agencies for the U.S. Department of Education provides a thorough overview and 
specific suggestions of what an emergency operations plan should include.205 Also in the 
guide are recommendations for annexes, one of which includes recovery.206 The guide 
has a wide spectrum of considerations for school planning; the information provided is 
more strategic in its presentation than tactical. However, it is very comprehensive in 
planning considerations in comparison to other government documentation found in this 
research. 
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A recommended strategy in recovery planning is to include in the emergency 
operations plan an appendix or addendum specific to recovery.207 A phased approach 
will guide the user through the process one step at a time. With this approach, the plan 
user will always know where they are in the process and can look ahead in the process to 
help inform imminent planning decisions. As stated in Chapter I, the recovery process 
begins when the life safety threat to civilians and responders has ended. Once the scene is 
declared safe by law enforcement, the phased approach to recovery begins with the 
removal of the lockdown order authorized by law enforcement. A phased approach to 
recovery, in its entirety, may include all of the following components. 
1. Lockdown 
Lockdown is the process by which students and faculty secure themselves in a 
room by locking the door and turning down the lights. The occupants will turn phones off 
and move to a corner away from windows; they should pull shades down if applicable. 
Some school plans may have in place a method for teachers to mark the door with red or 
green placards of some kind; this indicates to law enforcement the status of the room 
occupants, red meaning there is trouble and green indicates all room occupants are okay.208 
The decision to have a lockdown procedure is widely accepted, the specifics of 
the procedure are very often contested; this is due to high-profile systematic protocols 
that have surfaced since Columbine. Protocols such as Alert Lockdown Inform Counter 
Evacuate (ALICE) and Run-Hide-Fight have created differences in recommendations 
among experts.209 Because there are no specific standards in protocol supported by state 
or federal mandates, direction for lockdown actions often vary. It is important that 
districts consider there may be distinct differences in the protocols established for 
elementary and secondary schools. Some opponents have objections to school plans that 
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call for using codes to call for a lockdown because they can be confusing. Another 
potential policy is to have different levels of lockdown, so hesitation or fear of setting a 
false alarm does not stop someone from initiating a lockdown.210 Experts have suggested 
that teachers keep their classroom door locked during teaching time.211 This tactic may 
vary in its acceptance for differences in school cultures; however, if it was presented to 
the schools by recommendation it would provide the schools with a more solid 
foundation from which to make their argument in support of such a tactic.  
Counterfactual Input: These lockdown procedures described are not part of the 
recovery process; such procedures are part of the response to an active shooter. However, 
understanding lockdown procedures will help set the stage for recovery because recovery 
begins with the organized release of students by law enforcement from their lockdown 
status. A comprehensive plan in place for recovery would include procedures for 
lockdown release. In the sample study of Rocori High School, a plan for a structured 
release was not in place.212 According to Rocori School Superintendent Scott Staska, an 
organized evacuation of students was required; however, the process was hastened as 
there was not an established protocol in place for this procedure. As a result, it took 
longer than necessary to inform students and faculty that it was safe to come out of their 
rooms.213 By incorporating release procedures into the recovery plan, all school faculty 
will have the knowledge to inform their students of the forthcoming process, 
consequently reducing anxiety while also expediting the process.  
2. Evacuation  
The next phase is the evacuation phase—evacuation begins once the lockdown 
order has been released. Activation of the recovery operations starts here. Standard 
practice is for law enforcement to execute or oversee a controlled evacuation of all 
students once the area is clear. Law enforcement will declare the school a crime scene; 
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students and faculty will not be allowed to take items such as purses, backpacks, or other 
personal items with them when they evacuate.214 The plan must include the availability 
of transportation for moving all students, staff, and faculty to a remote location away 
from the affected school.  
A recent national disaster report card from the non-governmental relief organization 
Save the Children states that for the first time, more than half the states have written into 
their school emergency plans four minimum standards for a disaster plan developed by a 
national commission: evacuation/relocation plans, children with special needs plans, 
family-child reunification plans, and K-12 multiple disaster plans.215 An article written in 
the Michigan Daily calls out its state as one of the states cited in the Save the Children 
report as not meeting the minimum standards.216 Again, as recommendations but not 
requirements, they lack the authority to build in the uniformity needed for districts to build 
highly effective plans throughout the state.217 The report calls for legislators to set a 
statewide policy for emergency plans. When schools are left to their own discretion for 
emergency planning, other factors enter into the mix that will affect continuity between 
districts such as financial resources and experience in emergency planning development.218 
This creates the silo planning effect, which puts kids at risk.  
Counterfactual Input: Without a plan in place, victims have found themselves in 
the middle of a chaotic evacuation process.219 Columbine students who escaped the 
school grounds sought sanctuary in multiple places. Nearby houses, an adjacent park, and 
the public library were all sources of refuge for victims of the shooting. This also 
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included Leawood Elementary, which became the final location for reunification. 
Students attending Leawood were instructed to go to the cafeteria and wait for their 
parents, while Columbine students were brought to the gymnasium.220 According to the 
report from the Columbine Review Commission, the public library closed at 6 pm, 
forcing those waiting there to be relocated to Leawood Elementary.221 Eventually the 
reunification was accomplished but the challenges experienced provide a clear illustration 
how a preconceived plan for operations to relocate students and parents can reduce 
frustration and anxiety. 
3. Relocation and Reunification 
The relocation and reunification process is generally considered to transpire in 
one location. In certain circumstances it may be necessary to shuttle students once the 
custodial authorization is affirmed; the need to facilitate the reunion remotely is 
determined by geography and infrastructure. Nonetheless, even when the process is 
entirely conducted in one facility there are many moving parts to consider. These moving 
parts are separated out as eight subsections, as follows; Sections a through h were all 
discussed during planning meetings and considered to be important components for a 
real-world relocation and reunification recovery plan. 
a. Location and the Building Footprint 
A relocation site suitable to house the entire student body needs to be secured 
with a memorandum of understanding, if the building is not operated by the district. The 
building must be carefully considered; the footprint and access and egress are critical 
components. If this is where parents will pick up their children, there will need to be a 
large parking lot with police-controlled traffic to get in and out. If the building has large 
windows, the students should not be allowed to occupy those spaces in front of them. 
Parents seeing their children will want to immediately remove them; taking this action 
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would disrupt the accountability process.222 This will create problems as there needs to 
be a registration process to facilitate a handoff of custody. Parents that can see their child 
but not remove them will create unneeded anxiety. It is best to have the kids somewhere 
else in the building and retrieved via “runners” once parents have signed in.  
The building should have an area large enough to be able to feed all of the 
students. If the event that caused the lockdown happens prior to the lunch period, students 
would not have had a chance to eat. It may be many hours before the students are allowed 
to go home because police may want to speak with many of them. Also, counselors may 
want to get an early evaluation of student and faculty mental well-being before they go 
home. Additionally, in lieu of a Family Assistance Center, the relocation building may 
need to have an area that is private enough to facilitate death notifications and 
conversations with family members in regard to body identification. The building should 
be in close proximity to the school, allowing for separation from the event but still allow 
for a feeling of connection to those left behind. The plan should call for assistance by law 
enforcement or the fire department to control the traffic route from the school to the 
alternate location. Upon arrival to the relocated site, there are many considerations for the 
school that the plan should include. 
b. Split Students by Grade 
An early planning consideration for the relocation site is how the students are 
going to be split up. All schools will approach this differently, as elementary school 
students have different considerations and needs from their middle-school and high-
school classmates. However, the plan needs to identify if the students will be separated 
by grade, classroom, etc., and the building also needs to be handicap accessible. 
Consideration must also be provided for students with functional needs, both for 
transportation and presence at the relocation site.  
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c. Private Rooms for Immediate Aftermath Counseling 
The building used for relocation should have privacy rooms available for 
counseling. Separate rooms have to be available to provide for early notification to 
families. Also, some witnesses to the event may require early intervention to cope with 
the unexpected high levels of anxiety commonly seen in an active shooter–type event. 
d. Medical Availability for Students with Medication Needs  
Another consideration for the plan is medical dispensing. Students evacuating will 
not be allowed to bring anything with them, this includes purses, backpacks, etc., that 
may contain medications. The school’s plan needs to have annual updates of the students 
with medical requirements and make arrangements for those medications to be delivered 
to the relocation site. This can be accomplished with a written contract between the local 
ambulance provider, hospital, doctor clinic, etc., and the school. 
e. Attendance Accountability, School Network Compatibility  
It can be assumed schools affected by a spontaneous crisis such as an active-
shooter incident are going to be challenged with student accountability. Again, this 
challenge may vary depending on the age of the students. Regardless, attendance at the 
relocation site will be required. The plan should include a method for the administrative 
leaders at the relocation site to access the district’s computer network or server. This will 
aid in assessing attendance, students’ schedules, and may also assist with access to 
information regarding custody concerns.  
f. Non–English Speaking Students 
There are schools all across the nation that have significant non-English speaking 
populations. It is essential for every district with non-English speaking populations to have 
in their plan a process to assure the capability to communicate with non-English speaking 
students and their families during and following a disaster. It is critical that translated 
communications are available in verbal and written form.223 Additionally, contact numbers 
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for counselors speaking different languages should also be written into the plan. Some 
states have platforms from which they can disseminate emergency information to the non-
English speaking public. In Minnesota, ECHO (Emergency, Community, Health and 
Outreach) is a leader in providing a communication model that can reach more than a 
dozen different-language speaking audiences during a crisis.224 Messages pertaining to the 
emergency and recommended actions to be taken by the pubic are available through ECHO 
partnerships, the medium for messaging is diverse and includes television, radio, and 
ECHO’s website. Additionally, during events, public safety managers distribute a phone 
number to be used by non-English speakers who may call and receive critical information 
regarding the emergency in their own language.225 This is an invaluable resource for 
schools; if this type of resource is available in the district’s area, it should be considered for 
inclusion into the communications piece of the EOP. 
g. Relocation Site Security—Media and Parent Surge 
When schools consider a building for the relocation of all students, staff, and 
faculty, among many of the concerns must be security. When a crisis happens such as a 
school shooting, experience has shown that the media response to the location will be 
swift and will soon become overwhelming. The plan must illustrate procedures for 
security of the building and controlled access to the parking areas. No media should be 
allowed general access to the relocation site. A primary and alternate site for media 
should be designated in the plan.226 Students and faculty should be advised to not speak 
with the media directly.  
Security will also be needed to enable the parent/student reunification process; 
desperate parents seeking answers about their children’s safety will seek the path of least 
resistance to reunite themselves with their child.227 As outlined in a sound crisis plan, 
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proper and sufficient security measures put in place will help control the urge for parents 
to circumvent planning protocols in their frantic effort to find their child. A good security 
plan will help bring structure to what will be an unavoidably intense and often chaotic 
process. Finally, a strong security presence will help ensure the students that they are safe 
from any more threats.  
h. Parent/Guardian Custodial Consideration and Confirmation 
In any crisis event where children and parents are separated, it will always be one 
of public safety’s top priorities to reunite them as soon as possible.228 Regardless of the 
crisis, incident officials must be certain that the person given custody is permitted to 
accept it and not just well-intended family, a friend, or an acquaintance. There are already 
in-use processes available for reuniting parents with their children. Personal student 
information cards can be pre-drafted ahead of time identifying custodial arrangements 
and all other pertinent information.229 This type of process should be mandatory so the 
school can be certain each child is accounted for and handed off to the designated 
individual with custodial rights. The cards can also provide a record documenting that the 
student was there during the event, and possibly more details such as non-family 
members authorized to take custody of the child.230 If the school has the means to 
safeguard the student’s medical information, and it satisfies Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act rules, the cards could also provide important crisis information 
such as allergies or current medications.231  
Counterfactual Input: Some parents of Sandy Hook children also endured 
reunification anxiety that could have been reduced by implementing a plan to bring 
parents and students together and provide them critical information. As described in a 
blog by a parent of one of the fatally shot children of Sandy Hook, there was no order to 
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the reunification process; in fact, some people were picking up other people’s children, 
which created more confusion.232 Plans, processes, and templates are available to assist 
in the development of reunification protocols, which will provide for an organized 
reunion of family members.233 
4. Ongoing Counseling and Therapy  
Research has revealed that for many students, teachers, responders, and the 
community, the emotional recovery from an active-shooter incident will be the most 
challenging of the recovery process. Witnessing a violent event such as an active-shooter 
incident can be emotionally traumatic. Experiencing such a violent event in what was 
previously perceived to be a safe and comfortable environment such as a school can be the 
source of long-term emotional struggles, which could culminate in post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). In the wake of the Virginia Tech shooting in April 2007, the school 
counseling center treated more than 1,000 individuals in the first week; these included 
students, faculty, and university staff.234 A survey was conducted at Virginia Tech at three 
months post-incident; “at least 5 percent self-reported significant symptoms of PTSD and 
an additional 21 percent reported symptoms consistent with elevated risk for PTSD.”235 
History has demonstrated that in many disasters, close examination of human 
behavior will show the best and worst of human intent. News reports following disasters 
often show civilian would-be rescuers, or conversely, citizens looting businesses, 
demonstrating the best and worst of human actions. In the mental health and behavioral 
field, it is common to see mental health practitioners step forward and offer their services 
to help victims, responders, and their community.236 It should be understood and 
considered by school district personnel when developing this portion of their crisis plan 
that there is a distinction between social behavior counseling and psychoanalysis from 
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disaster-specific specialized counseling such as “psychological first aid.”237 Mental 
health professionals agree that most commonly used techniques for counseling therapy 
are not an effective method for counseling those in the immediate aftermath of a major 
crisis or terrorist type event.238 School districts are best served by including in their 
planning disaster volunteer agencies such as the Red Cross. The American Red Cross 
offers a training program specific to crisis response counseling.239 
As witnessed in Newtown Connecticut following the events at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School, mental health behavior counselors will travel from outside the area to 
offer their services.240 Some will have the best intentions, others may not. The crisis plan 
should have procedures in place to credential all behavioral counselor professionals to 
protect the victims and the community from opportunists. The plan can identify pre-
determined relationships with therapists or organizations that supply therapists or 
psychologists. The Sandy Hook report asserts “the plan should clarify a range of roles 
and responsibilities, including the management of the school behavioral health response, 
provision of security, and operation of a family assistance center and a community 
assistance center.”241 
At the time of the Sandy Hook shooting, the citizens of Chardon Ohio and its high 
school community were nine months into their recovery from an active-shooter event. A 
2007 GAO report had identified the state of Ohio as requiring all districts to have 
emergency management plans.242 The facts of this case reinforce the assertion of this 
paper’s premise that more stringent requirements for planning are necessary. In Chardon, 
a recovery plan was not in effect at the time of the shooting.243 In order to cope with the 
demand for recovery resources, Chardon had to reach out for help. Without a process in 
                                                 
237 Tanielian and Stein, “Understanding and Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of 
Terrorism,” 697 
238 Tanielian and Stein, 697 
239 Tanielian and Stein. 
240 “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 200 
241 “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission.” 
242 Ashby, Emergency Management, 6 
243 Steele, Trauma in Schools and Communities, 122 
 67
place to vet incoming specialists, some of those offering to help were of less value to the 
mission.244 Fortunately, for those most affected, resources and services were provided 
through the United Way, including a strategic planning committee and ongoing wellness 
programs.245 The recovery process will look different to everyone. In Chardon, they 
conducted memorials at the one- and two-year anniversaries of the event.246 
Understandably some did not feel the need to participate; however, others did. The school 
recovery plan has to include the ongoing mental health recovery process and all its 
components; the process does not end because the students have returned to class.  
5. Funerals and Memorials  
A comprehensive school recovery plan will include policies that address funerals 
and memorials following a crisis. In a high-profile event such as an active-shooter 
incident, funerals for the victims often become an important healing milestone for the 
entire community: students, faculty, staff, district personnel, and community residents 
attend the services and share their grief fostered by a common thread. Schools should 
acknowledge in their plan that attendance by staff and administrators will send a message 
of support. Every crisis is different, so schools should identify liaisons to communicate 
preferences of the victim’s families.  
In high-profile active-shooter events such as Columbine, the school principal and 
school administrators were in attendance at the funerals of students and faculty.247 
School recovery plans should identify a team of individuals available that can represent 
the schools at all funerals and memorials. The plan may suggest at a minimum that at 
least one school representative will attend every funeral or memorial. At a minimum, the 
plan may suggest an ad-hoc committee be assembled post-incident to address the specific 
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needs as determined by the incident and the individuals involved. If it is addressed in the 
plan, it stands less of a chance of being overlooked during a busy recovery period.  
Memorials, like funerals, are an important piece to emotional health following a 
tragic event. They can serve many purposes but also can be controversial. Because of the 
very nature of life, many students in the midst of an active-shooter crisis recovery will be 
experiencing for the first time the death of someone they know.248 Funerals can be very 
effective in that children who attend will see others expressing their grief and anxiety in 
similar ways, thus making them feel normal about their thoughts, behaviors, and 
questions.249 By having school personnel in attendance, they can help guide students 
through the grieving process by virtue of their experience, leadership, and mentorship. 
However, as mentioned earlier, holding or establishing memorials can be controversial, 
some may see memorials as reliving the incident. 
Navigating through the process of determining whether or not there should be a 
memorial will be made easier if the school recovery plan illustrates a policy and/or 
identifies a memorial committee. In general, memorials will take form in one of three 
ways: permanent, semi-permanent, or temporary: 
 Permanent—artwork, plaques, or stone markers 
 Semi-permanent—planting a tree or garden, awarding a scholarship, or 
conducting an annual fundraiser 
 Temporary—website, message banners, or conducting a candlelight 
vigil250 
Controversy ensued the week after the Columbine shootings when a good 
Samaritan erected 15 hand-made crosses in Clement Park, about two miles from the 
school. Originally, the memorial display consisting of the eight-foot tall crosses 
contained two crosses that bared the names of the killers. A father of one of the victims 
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removed the two controversial crosses.251 In the end, a final permanent memorial was 
designed and built. Sometimes seemingly innocuous gestures such as a temporary 
memorial plaque or hallway banner memorializing a victim(s) may present a challenge to 
those suffering emotional pain from the event. Seeing the memorial conjures up images 
and forces them to relive the events. For these reasons it serves the district best to appoint 
a memorial committee and provide for open discussion with survivors and their families 
about what their needs are and proceed accordingly with memorials. 
6. Faculty and Staff Reduction 
History has shown that dramatic, high-anxiety events such as active-shooter 
events have long-lasting mental health effects. It is reasonable and practical for school 
districts to expect a 70 to 80 percent turnover rate for district and school staff and faculty 
in the first three to five years following an active-shooter event.252 The effects of those 
involved at Sandy Hook Elementary were right in line with the national trend. Following 
the events there, multiple teachers transferred to other schools or retired.253 At 
Columbine High School, 60 percent had left in the first three years following the incident. 
As a comparison, the entire district had only seen an 11 percent turnover in teacher 
positions in the two years following the incident.254 During the recovery process for 
Santana High School, nine staff members requested time off with the minimum request 
for time being four weeks. This occurred during the first year following the shooting.255 
In some cases, it is the location itself that continues to be a reminder to the 
individual about the horrific events of the past. Survivors of crisis incidents sometimes 
find the physical surroundings of the location to be too much, creating a constant 
reminder of the tragedies they witnessed. At Columbine, psychologists were consulted to 
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bring about physical changes within the school—both dramatic and subtle—to help foster 
a healthier mental health recovery.256 It is commonly understood that sights, sounds, and 
smells can be powerful memory triggers; in some cases, these senses become reminders 
of a past horrific event. Because association of these tragic events can resurface without 
warning, schools and districts have seen reductions in faculty, sometimes years following 
the event.257 An effective school recovery plan would not have to design a solution to 
this potential happening; instead, it should identify it as a likely certainty, thus converting 
what may otherwise become an unforeseen exodus of staff into an expected reality. 
7. Suicide Awareness and Prevention 
According to the Columbine Governor’s Report, the commission writing the 
report was told teen suicides had increased in Jefferson County (the county where 
Columbine High School is located) following the high school shooting.258 Research for 
this thesis was unsuccessful in substantiating a claim that suicide rates increase following 
an active-shooter event; however, an article written by the National Center for PTSD 
asserts that there is a link between post-traumatic stress disorder and suicidal thoughts or 
behaviors.259 Every student’s experience from an active-shooter incident will vary in its 
degree of exposure to the trauma. Not every student or staff member will develop PTSD 
or even show symptoms of the disorder; however, other social irregularities may surface 
such as depression or social isolation.  
It is essential that emergency recovery plans identify this and suggest measures to 
monitor the students and faculty for signs or symptoms of depression. Processes can be put 
in place such as anonymous surveys or group therapy sessions where open discussion can 
be conducted and evaluated by mental health professionals. A hotline can be recommended 
by the plan to provide 24-hour response to those searching for help or answers.  
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8. Donation Management 
As is the case in many types of disasters, knowledge of the events is broadcast 
across the nation, sometimes the world. Many members of the public feel the need to help 
in some small way. Some of them will accomplish this by sending donations, sometimes 
in the form of money, but it may also be in the form of personal items. These could range 
from a simple card, or a signed hood from a NASCAR race car. In the case of Sandy 
Hook, it took less than a week for those responsible for donations to become grossly 
overwhelmed by countless items sent from all over the world. 
 
Figure 1.  Donations Received at Sandy Hook.260  
                                                 
260 Source (top): Kix, “65,000 Teddy Bears for Newtown, and One Man to Sort the World’s Grief”; 




Blindsided by the kindness, school officials had no plan for coping with the 
enormous quantity of gifts. Just three business days following the tragedy, six delivery 
trucks showed up packed with teddy bears, banners, letters, and more.261  
In an urgent effort, the town’s tax assessor, tasked with managing the donations, 
quickly secured a storage space with over 80,000 square feet. Within a week, that area 
was full. The post office was so inundated it had to reroute delivers to one of several 
regional hubs.262 This type of generosity is not uncommon following a disaster. 
Following the active shooting event that took place at Virginia Tech, the school received 
over 100,000 items, which included cards, letters, artwork, and a painted memorial 
NASCAR hood.263 Either way, if the school’s plan does not recognize the possibility of 
thousands of donations, they stand the potential to become quickly overwhelmed. 
Schools will be best served to have a plan that identifies volunteers willing to address 
donation management on the school’s behalf.  
B. SUMMARY 
To write the recovery process into a planning format requires breaking it down 
into its separate parts. When doing this, it may be easier to absorb the entire mission 
conceptually by looking at it as a linear process, a sort of timeline of events that are 
expected to occur based on previous events. Examining the process piece by piece 
elucidates the resource demand for personnel, should all the functions to recovery need 
to be addressed. A robust recovery plan will recognize that the phases of recovery 
require many people. Planning for three-deep redundancy is a good planning principle. 
Picturing the recovery process as a linear timeline may help keep it manageable in 
terms of its scope.  
The next chapter describes several more planning concepts common to 
emergency management; if incorporated routinely they will serve to support a stronger 
preparedness program. To support a school’s investment in developing a plan for an 
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active-shooter incident, the next chapter provides several examples of disasters from 
threats unrelated to active shooter. The intent of including disaster details that are off-
topic is to demonstrate that many of the preparedness procedures discussed in this 
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V. SUPPORTING ELEMENTS FOR A STRONGER PROGRAM 
The recovery process as described in Chapter IV is the sum of many phases that 
guide it to its inevitable end. Its success, however, can be influenced by supporting 
elements taken from standard emergency management principles. Implementing the 
following planning and preparedness components contributes to a stronger emergency 
management program by increasing knowledge and familiarity with the plan. 
Incidentally, these elements and the model for the recovery element that follows, build 
the capacity for responding and recovering from numerous disaster threats. 
A. TRAININGS AND EXERCISES 
Dwight D. Eisenhower coined the phrase “plans are worthless but planning is 
everything.”264 A takeaway from this quote is that plans have a tendency to be built and 
then set aside to be neglected indefinitely. Another takeaway is that the relationships 
developed during the planning process are more important than the plan itself. Many 
experienced crisis survivors might agree. There is value in knowing who your partners 
will be when you have to put a plan into practice. A common vernacular to hear and 
practice in emergency management is that it is best to exchange business cards during the 
planning process than to do so on the front lines of a disaster. It makes sense to want to 
go into battle with someone you know. This is why crisis trainings and exercises are so 
important. 
Some states, including Minnesota, by statute require each school district to have 
five fire drills every school year.265 The Minnesota statute also requires each district to 
adopt a crisis management policy that must be developed by committee of no less than 11 
disciplines, and requires five lockdown drills.266 Unfortunately, other than fire and 
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lockdown drills, nowhere in the Minnesota statute does it require schools to drill, train, or 
exercise elements of the crisis plan. Training and exercising fire drills and lockdown 
drills are effective because they reinforce the understanding of actions delineated in the 
crisis plan. The actions taken by students and staff become routine by establishing a 
participant’s pattern for response.267 The same principle applies to the reunification of 
parents and students; practice of this process conditions participants for what to expect in 
a real event. Even a clearly illustrated plan would be better executed if the process has 
been practiced by participants from all sides.  
Training and exercising a school’s emergency plan deserves at least as much 
attention as applied to fire drills and fire safety. A 2007 report reveals an estimated 27 
percent of districts with crisis plans in place have not trained or exercised aspects of their 
plan with their local public safety responders.268 Another report by the same agency 
conducted nine years later in 2016 reveals nine states require school districts to exercise 
their active-shooter plans while 35 require fire drills. Only 12 states require individual 
schools to conduct an exercise of their active-shooter plan.269 Schools may be more 
susceptible to complacency in terms of training and exercising because the inherent 
turnover of parents and students from year to year makes the thought of continued 
engagement seem daunting. In reality, the turnover is exactly the reason for annual 
training and exercises. Every year ushers in new parents and students unfamiliar with the 
emergency procedures enacted when an emergency plan is activated because of a crisis. It 
seems unreasonable to insist on continued fire drills but not require an exercise of the 
recovery plan. Research into the number of fatalities resulting from fires in the last two 
decades compared to fatalities from active-shooter incidents may reveal the need to shift 
priorities in preparedness. 
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B. AFTER ACTION REPORT—THE KEY TO LESSONS LEARNED 
The value of AARs is recognized by their inclusion as a requirement for grant 
compliance. FEMA disperses billions of dollars through the Homeland Security Grant 
Program.270 One of the grants in the program is the Emergency Management 
Performance Grant program (EMPG). The EMPG program is designed to help states 
expand their local, territorial, and tribal governments in their preparation for all-hazards 
planning.271 As a requirement of the grant, participants that receive funding must 
complete three exercises annually.272 The exercises are expected to be progressive, 
moving from the basic drill or workshop to a full-scale exercise. To remain in 
compliance, all jurisdictions must complete AARs for every exercise; the AAR tracks the 
objectives outlined by the exercise planner.273 Exercise evaluators record the successes 
and failures in the AAR. The idea is that by recording the events of the exercise, the AAR 
provides the owners a documented reference of actions and protocols pertaining to their 
successes. The documented failures become areas for improvement to be tested at the 
next progressive exercise.  
The AAR is an important planning tool that should not be reserved only for 
checking the box for grant compliance. An AAR can also function as a permanent record 
for real-life events, capturing event details as they occur and then storing the information 
until the implementation of improvements can be applied. At such time, comparisons can 
be made between past and present, illustrating the advances made in the development of 
preparedness plans and the ability to carry them into action. An AAR requirement for 
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schools in their trainings and exercises as well as real-life events should become a staple 
in their emergency management protocols.  
C. FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTER 
The Family Assistance Center (FAC) is a structured operation designed for 
response to mass fatality incidents. The intention of the model (created by the National 
Transportation Safety Board) is to provide specific services to the families of the victims 
involved in a fatal disaster.274 As learned from many previous fatality incidents, families 
of victims need immediate and accurate information without pressure from the media. 
The FAC is set up to create a safe place for families where they have direct contact with 
public-safety responders who can provide timely and accurate information regarding their 
loved ones. In emergency management circles, it is intentionally set up using the incident 
command system and it has the capacity to receive current information directly from the 
disaster scene via a liaison with incident command. Because of the emotional impact of 
the information families receive during the early stages of a disaster, the FAC model is 
instrumental to the immediate and long-term emotional and mental wellness of family 
members. 
The FAC model was born out of the aviation industry, where families of victims 
involved in airline crashes needed many types of support structures while news of their 
loved ones was being determined.275 In large-scale disasters, it is possible for families to 
wait hours or even days for confirmation of their loved ones’ fate. During this time, 
counseling support is available ranging from county social workers to the families’ own 
clergy. Progress on victim recovery is shared with the family, including information that 
may not be made public. Depending on the size of the event and number of fatalities, 
families of victims may receive death notifications at the FAC.  
The FAC model is a necessary consideration for school emergency planning. It is 
too big and complex to expect a district to have the resources or personnel to manage 
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such an operation; however, it would be prudent for districts to identify the need in the 
plan and work with their local emergency manager on a plan to fill this need if it is ever 
required. Some local emergency managers have partnerships in place that can help set up 
an FAC, such as county human services departments, medical reserve corps, and the Red 
Cross. As a part of the school plan, identifying possible FAC locations would be a good 
first step to offering this capability. They should not be considered with the same 
locations used to facilitate the reunification of students evacuated with their parents.  
D. RECOVERY APPLIED TO ALL HAZARDS  
The focus of this thesis is on recovery planning for active-shooter events in K-12 
schools. The recovery process that is supported by the concepts and principles identified 
in these pages is applicable to recovery from a host of other types of disasters. Schools 
that are prepared for active-shooter recovery have the capacity to leverage the phases of 
recovery already in place. In a sense, having a recovery plan for an active-shooter event 
is a force multiplier for planning, because by preparing for the worst, they have prepared 
for the rest. The following examples demonstrate the value of recovery plan guidance in 
non–active-shooter disasters. 
1. Moore, Oklahoma, May 20, 2013 
The city of Moore, Oklahoma, was devastated by an ESF-5 tornado in May 
2013. The storm caused approximately $2 billion in damage and killed 24 people.276 
Included in the destruction was damage to Briarwood Elementary School and the 
complete devastation of Plaza Tower Elementary School, where seven children died in 
the building collapse.277 In 2003, the state passed a law requiring all public schools to 
have an emergency management plan that specifically addressed tornados and severe 
weather. The law, House Bill 1512, further states that districts are authorized to make 
additions to buildings to provide protection to all occupants against severe weather 
                                                 




threats.278 By all research accounts, Moore School District did have a crisis plan; 
however, a copy of the plan was unavailable in the open-source arena.  
When the district received the weather warning that day, the plan was put into 
action.279 At the time, the only action available was to shelter in place, and that was the 
action taken at both schools. Following the disaster, parents of the students at Plaza 
Tower were sent to a church to reunify with their children. Again, research was unable to 
ascertain whether that procedure was planned. The Moore School District had to relocate 
all students and faculty for both elementary schools for the next school year. Briarwood 
Elementary students were assigned to Emmaus Baptist Church while Plaza Tower classes 
were held at Central Junior High.280 The Moore example shows that regardless of the 
crisis, emergency planning considerations such as long-term relocation, parent/student 
reunification, and mental health recovery are critical components to a recovery. 
In Moore, the mental health aspect to the tornado disaster did not seem to reach 
the same level of attention as the active-shooter disasters reviewed in Chapter II. Moore’s 
school superintendent stated that with the assistance of grant funding, he expected to see 
two to four counselors at each school for the year beginning after the tornado struck.281 
In several other sample studies, schools sought to have dozens of counselors on hand, and 
in at least one case, they were set to have one in every classroom when school 
resumed.282 Counselors were also requested in Moore shortly after the storm; ten days 
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following the disaster students, parents, and staff were given the opportunity to meet with 
counselors at one of the remaining schools.283 
2. Livingston Parish, Louisiana, August, 2016 
The second week of August 2016 brought over two feet of rainfall to the southern 
and southeaster portions of Louisiana. In all, more than 25 inches of rain fell in 
Livingston Parish, just east of Baton Rouge. More than a dozen lives were lost and tens 
of thousands were evacuated.284 The flooding caused 22 school districts to close and 
displaced 4,000 faculty and staff from their homes. Livingston Parish School 
Superintendent Rick Wentzel reported his district had to close one-third of its schools, 
eight of them having suffered serious damage.285  
Research on Livingston Parish Schools produced a document dated October 2014, 
nearly two years prior to the extreme rain events; the two-page document specifically 
references a need for emergency preparedness actions. It requires every school to have a 
crisis management and response plan that specifically addresses active shooters but also 
will apply to any type of emergency threat or hazard. It also calls for the inclusion of the 
“whole community” model as offered by FEMA, which proposes the development of 
partnerships among all agencies and non-governmental organizations for a disaster 
response.286 The document also requires principals to incorporate monthly drills into 
their preparedness activities and to write follow-up reports for each drill performed and to 
share that report with faculty. Livingston Parish Public Schools also has an emergency 
planning location for parents of students on its website. The information on the website 
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advises parents what emergency plans consist of, what actions the schools will take 
throughout the year to remain prepared, and advice for parental actions for when disaster 
strikes.287  
By all accounts, given the extent of the damage faced by the southern portion of 
the state, it appears that neither Livingston Parish nor any other parishes could have 
prepared for what happened. The National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration website 
dated August 19, 2016, described this disaster as a 1-in-500-year event.288 Livingston 
Parish required each school to have several relocation sites identified; however, with the 
extent of damage this type of disaster brings, even the redundancy built into the best 
plans was rendered ineffective. Although they were not attending the school they had 
registered for earlier in the summer, students in Livingston Parish were back in school 
within four weeks of the disaster.  
E. CONCLUSION 
All of the information schools need to be prepared, to protect themselves, and to 
recover is available and in some cases, already in practice, albeit fragmented in many 
cases. Sound preparedness practices such as full-scale exercises are in large part not 
being conducted in the school environment.289 States need to harness this information 
and put it into one package that is applicable to school preparedness planning. 
Proficiency in the practice of using AARs could simply be developed by requiring them 
for fire drills and lockdown drills. With exercises as a requirement of the plan, AARs 
would assist in the school’s quest to prepare. Other important planning concepts such as 
an FAC can be leveraged by building relationships with local emergency managers and 
capitalizing on plans already in place.  
Holistic recovery planning adds many layers to the recovery concept. Whether it 
is imbedded in the emergency basic plan, a part of a recovery annex, or stand-alone 
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requirements, a sound recovery plan depends on factors considered outside the standard 
phases of recovery. Preparations such as training and exercising current plans, or 
developing separate planning annexes such as family assistance centers or donation 
management, raises a school’s readiness for all-hazards recovery. The time and resources 
invested to develop a recovery plan for active shooters can easily be leveraged for other 
threats against schools such as floods, tornados, or fire. The benefits of having a recovery 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
It is common knowledge in public safety to expect chaos at the onset of an 
emergency incident. Medical responders often refer to the golden hour as an important 
window of time where emergency actions applied during that time may be the difference 
between life and death. Such urgency creates tense moments and oftentimes high levels 
of anxiety. Experience in emergency management disaster circumstances reflects a 
similar phenomenon. The first hour is chaotic, and information is sketchy at best or 
acutely inaccurate at worst. In those instances where a full resolution is far past a one-
hour window, having an emergency operations plan to activate can usher in a sense of 
control to the scene.  
When we look to active-shooter incidents at K-12 schools, it is now understood 
through the research that the incident will not be over in that one-hour period. The 
research for this thesis reveals concerns in the confidence level that an emergency 
response plan designed and practiced by the school is available and ready for activation. 
In truth, the real preparedness begins long before the plan is activated. Research has made 
it clear, schools have the guidance available to them to assist in the development of 
emergency plans with a focused concentration on all phases of recovery. Who will take 
the first step in making K-12 recovery planning a top priority? 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS—RESTATED 
1. What are the most important elements of active-shooter recovery plans for 
K-12 schools? 
2. What can we learn from previous K-12 active-shooter events to inform 
measures of effectiveness in recovery? 
Examination of past active-shooter events shows that the recovery process is most 
often measured in years; this fact makes it difficult to identify priorities for planning 
content. The need is for all schools to develop a comprehensive plan that includes all 
elements contributing to a return to normalcy, or as close to it as possible. The objective 
for this thesis was to identify important elements that the research identified, but it is 
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critical to understand that an effective plan must not contain only the elements identified 
as “most important.” 
A common thread in preparedness planning is to prepare for the worst and hope 
for the best. Many would probably agree a mass murder occurring at a school is among 
the worst experiences for anyone. The schoolhouse atmosphere has long been perceived 
as a sanctuary for children, a safe haven where children are afforded protection by 
teachers and principals who have their best interest in mind.290 This is the reason why the 
mental health effects of this type of crisis is one of the most important elements to an 
active-shooter recovery plan. When the perception of this safe environment is disrupted 
by a gruesome scene of violence, there is no mechanism in place for coping with it. This 
is also true for the community’s first responders, who are accustomed to witnessing 
victims of physical trauma.  
The sampling research conducted repeatedly identified the need for attention to 
emotional counseling for all parties involved in an active-shooter event, whether they are 
directly involved such as responding law enforcement, or indirectly involved such as a 
community resident. As such, school recovery planning must include procedures for 
procuring mental health counseling resources. This will be best accomplished by 
addressing local experts in this area in advance and including them in the plan through 
pre-drafted contracts or agreements. The school is also better served by this arrangement 
because the recovery process can take months or years; having local counselors involved 
means they will be around long term, guiding the victims’ emotional recovery until its 
conclusion. Communities of high-profile mass casualty events have had therapists travel 
long distances to help; this can be of value to help fill short-term needs but it is 
unsustainable for the long term. It is also important to highlight the difference between 
immediate crisis counseling and long-term therapy. There are specific credentials for 
professionals with the capability to provide immediate disaster counseling. Identifying 
this need in the school’s plan will also serve to secure this resource locally, when it is 
certain to be in high demand.  
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It is common practice in emergency management to conduct trainings, drills, and 
exercises in conjunction with emergency management partners such as police, fire, public 
works, etc. In the majority of these instances, communication issues are obstacles to 
success. An important element to every active-shooter recovery plan for K-12 schools is 
the attention brought to the many facets of communication. Active-shooter events are ripe 
for national news attention, sometimes international attention. Schools must have a plan 
for managing the barrage of media focus, lest they become overwhelmed and paint a 
public picture for themselves of mismanagement and lack of organization. In addition to 
accommodating the media, communication with the community, parents of students, and 
the faculty will be equally important. The district must have a plan for disseminating 
accurate information as well as the ability to dispel the flood of misinformation that 
occurs in every disaster. Facilitating a relationship with the media can also work in the 
schools’ favor by using them as source for disseminating accurate information. The need 
to handle the communication piece in an orderly manner cannot be overemphasized. This 
piece to the disaster will be long remembered as successful or something that exacerbated 
the problem. 
1. Recommendations—Gleaned from Research and Experience 
The bottom line for managing an active-shooter incident is readiness. The degree 
of detail put into the plan and the attention given to the plan once it is written will be 
proportional to the operational success of the recovery process.  
1. Develop a plan and update it annually. Every school must update the plan 
each summer. These adjustments will include staff changes and 
agreements with outside public and private organizations (such as food 
vendors for relocation sites). The plan must be comprehensive and 
incorporate all items identified in Chapter IV.  
2. Establishment of crisis teams. Every district should develop a crisis team 
that designates duties assigned to district personnel. Each task needs to be 
designated three-people deep to assure representation when duty calls. 
Areas of detail are to include funerals, memorials, donation management, 
social media, news media, reunification management, transportation, long-
term planning, and oversight for mental health counseling. 
3. Districts should implement an exercise schedule for each school that puts 
emphasis on some part of the plan. Each school can focus on a different 
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portion and begin a cycle of rotation. This leverages the ability to apply 
attention to as much of the plan as possible.  
4. Districts shall employ a full-time emergency coordinator. This person 
could also provide other services such as threat assessments and security. 
Where applicable, designated district emergency coordinators must be 
certified in emergency management principles. 
5. School districts will assign school resource officers at every middle school 
and high school. Resource officers are more than just a deterrent. They are 
a school’s first responder, student mentor, and an internal liaison with 
incident command.  
6. All school personnel must receive basic level training in the incident 
command system; supervisory staff are to receive training up to the ICS 
200 level  
2. Implementation 
Many school districts across the country are operating on tight budgets. The 
recommendations found here require the addition of resources, and resources cost money. 
It is imperative that states recognize the consequences of school plans that are incomplete 
or outdated and secure a means to prevent that possibility. The federal government must 
assist in the development and subsequently require minimum crisis planning criteria for 
all schools nationwide to include in their crisis plan. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH  
Several important aspects to recovery planning were not addressed during this 
research but should be considered when developing a recovery plan. First, the 
consideration for students with functional needs was not apparent in the reviews 
conducted for the incidents included in the sample research. As it is in all emergency 
planning, consideration for special needs population presents unique challenges with 
communication, transportation, sheltering, and other areas. Schools with students having 
special needs must consider what attention toward planning will be required for these 
students during times of crisis. For example, is there transportation available for 
wheelchair-bound students to relocate to a designated evacuation site? Is the relocation 
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site ADA compliant? In 2007, only 28 percent of districts with emergency management 
plans spelled out specific measures to be taken for students with functional needs.291  
Second, it is common for some schools to have non-English speaking populations. 
Students with English as a second language must be considered in all crisis planning.292 
These students are also more likely to have non-English speaking parents, which will 
impact their understanding of the district’s instructions unless countermeasures are taken 
to ensure public messaging is meant for all audiences. Further research is required 
regarding which criteria should be mandatory for school emergency planning for special 
needs populations, and how to assure such requirements are implemented.  
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